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COPYRIGHT’S TECHNO-PESSIMIST CREEP 
Xiyin Tang* 
 
Government investigations and public scrutiny of Big Tech are at an 
all-time high.  While current legal scholarship and government focus have 
centered overwhelmingly on whether and how antitrust law and § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act can be revised to address platform dominance, 
scant attention has been paid to another, almost unseen attempt to regulate 
Big Tech:  copyright law.  The recent adoption in Europe of Article 17 of the 
Copyright Directive, which holds internet platforms liable for 
user-generated creative content unless they obtain costly content licenses, is 
the most direct example of such regulation—and may serve as precedent for 
similar changes to U.S. law.  Meanwhile, before the courts and in the 
executive branch, copyright holders are increasingly harnessing anti–Big 
Tech sentiment to advocate for everything from weakening fair use doctrine 
to terminating long-standing government oversight of certain concentrated 
content holders. 
As recent scholarship laments the role that copyright minimalism played 
in the meteoric ascent of large technology platforms, this Article argues that 
increasing copyright protection will not combat monopolies.  The seemingly 
compelling public narrative that laws must be rewritten to combat power by 
any means necessary ignores the uniqueness of copyright markets as ones 
dominated not by diffuse, weak licensors bargaining with technology giants, 
but instead by large, oligopolistic content conglomerates.  Changes in 
copyright laws that increase the cost of content licenses fail to address, and 
indeed will only enrich, the long-standing dominance of traditional content 
licensors.  They will also entrench and concentrate licensees, creating a 
bilateral oligopolistic market for copyrighted works.  And such changes will, 
ultimately, hasten the obsolescence of the very content industries that 
advocated for these reforms, as today’s licensees evolve to become 
tomorrow’s licensors.  This Article concludes that to fight monopoly, to be 
truly neo-Brandeisian, one must think beyond copyright law. 
 
*  Assistant Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.  For helpful comments on earlier drafts, 
my thanks to Barton Beebe, James Boyle, Anupam Chander, Julie Cohen, Jeanne Fromer, Jill 
Horwitz, Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman, Jessica Litman, Mark McKenna, Neil Netanel, Jim 
Park, Kal Raustiala, Julia Reda, Kirk Stark, Andrew Verstein, Jacob Victor, and the 
participants at the Yale Law School Virtual Cyber Policy Series, the 2020 Intellectual Property 
Scholars Conference, the 2020 Works-in-Progress Workshop, the Junior Law and Tech 
Scholars forum, the UCLA Law School Junior Scholars Workshop, and the Hofstra Law 
School Intellectual Property Colloquium.  Elizabeth Anastasi provided superb research 
assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By many accounts, we are living in a new Gilded Age.  Large technology 
platforms, perhaps touted a decade ago as agents of change and 
democratization,1 have now found themselves increasingly under scrutiny, 
 
 1. See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS:  HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (discussing the internet’s potential 
to create new freedoms for making and exchanging “information, knowledge, and culture”).  
Importantly, the same champions for how the internet could democratize content distribution 
away from a handful of intermediaries for purposes of copyright law were notably less 
enthusiastic about the internet’s overall liberating force for democracy.  The same champions 
who extolled “remix culture” were the ones who were most skeptical of what James Boyle 
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both by governments around the world and in the court of public opinion.2  
As Senator Elizabeth Warren put it:  “Today’s big tech companies have too 
much power—too much power over our economy, our society and our 
democracy.”3  In this Article, I refer to this general sentiment—that Big Tech 
has become all-imposing, all-dominating, omnipotent, and omnipresent—as 
“techno-pessimism.”  Of course, the two most prominent legal areas in which 
this battle has played out are antitrust law4 and § 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996,5 the latter of which has repeatedly found itself in the 
national spotlight, especially after Twitter and Facebook permanently banned 
Donald Trump from their platforms following the Capitol riot.6 
 
calls “digital libertarianism”—letting the internet proceed apace without any government 
intervention. James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace:  Surveillance, Sovereignty, and 
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997) (arguing that digital libertarianism is 
inadequate because it enables private entities to engage in damaging acts of censorship and 
surveillance and because it allows states to do the same).  Or, as Lawrence Lessig, whose 
name has become synonymous with “remix culture,” put it:  “How do we protect liberty when 
the architectures of control are managed as much by the government as by the private sector?” 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE:  AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE xv (2006). 
 2. By one account, “[n]early two-thirds of Americans would support breaking up tech 
firms by undoing recent mergers, such as Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram . . . .” Emily 
Stewart, Poll:  Two-Thirds of Americans Want to Break Up Companies Like Amazon and 
Google, VOX (Sept. 18, 2019, 10:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/ 
9/18/20870938/break-up-big-tech-google-facebook-amazon-poll [https://perma.cc/GMX3-
76EB].  While I use the term “techno-pessimism,” the swing toward tech-negativity also has 
been broadly referred to by the popular press, and adopted by technology law scholars, as a 
“techlash.” See Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Fair Learning, 99 TEX. L. REV. 743, 747 
n.24 (2021) (citing Rachel Botsman, Dawn of the Techlash, GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2018,  
7:04 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/feb/11/dawn-of-the-techlash 
[https://perma.cc/7PAA-NYYN] (“Once seen as saviours of democracy, tech giants are now 
viewed as threats to truth.”)); Gregory Bobillot, ‘Techlash’—How Big Tech Is Influencing 
Your Thinking, FIN. TIMES (May 10, 2018), https://www.ft.com/video/3339f59e-f760-4bc7-
b359-3899fabbd190 [https://perma.cc/G6PV-78DC] (describing how too much time spent on 
social media can wreak havoc on your mental state); Eve Smith, The Techlash Against 
Amazon, Facebook and Google—And What They Can Do, ECONOMIST (Jan. 20, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/01/20/the-techlash-against-amazon-facebook-
and-google-and-what-they-can-do [https://perma.cc/HQF7-MVJ5] (describing a $2.7 billion 
fine from the European Commission against Google for privacy violations and how the 2020 
U.S. presidential candidates were all running on anti-tech platforms); The Techlash Has Just 
Begun, AXIOS (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.axios.com/the-techlash-1515609266-e27ca299-
0031-460a-96f1-db842ec88121.html [https://perma.cc/PU53-5XTV] (“The high-profile fight 
against big tech companies is just beginning, and it’s happening in response to crises over fake 
news, tech addiction and data security.”). 
 3. Lauren Gambino, ‘Too Much Power’:  It’s Warren v Facebook in a Key 2020 Battle, 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2019, 8:04 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/oct/19/ 
elizabeth-warren-facebook-break-up [https://perma.cc/F24N-BTV6]. 
 4. See generally TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS:  ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 
(2018) (arguing that antitrust laws should return, or pivot, to a “Neo-Brandeisian Agenda,” in 
turn subjecting tech companies like Amazon and Google to common carrier regulation). 
 5. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560–561 (1996).  Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
of 1996 immunizes internet platforms from liability resulting from the activities and speech 
of its users, so that a platform like Facebook will not be treated as the speaker for purposes of 
tort or criminal liability. See id. § 230. 
 6. See Vivek Ramaswamy & Jed Rubenfeld, Editorial, Save the Constitution From Big 
Tech, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2021, 12:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/save-the-
constitution-from-big-tech-11610387105 [https://perma.cc/Y6TT-4A9F] (arguing that § 230 
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This Article focuses on a different, unexamined, and unexpected area in 
which the law is subtly shifting to regulate the dominance of Big Tech:  
copyright. 
Of course, copyright law has long been an unanticipated nexus in which 
debates about technology, innovation, and disruption have played out.7  The 
traditional content industries—Hollywood, record labels, and book 
publishers—have never liked new technological entrants, be it the printing 
press, the VCR, or YouTube, and they’ve frequently invoked copyright law 
to protect their interests.8 
But while this fundamental antagonism and tension have stayed the same, 
the animating force behind it, the rhetoric, and the normative emphasis have 
changed.  Traditional content industries are no longer confined to the typical 
argument that, if left unchecked, the printing press, the VCR, or streaming 
services pose an existential threat that will ultimately signal the death of 
creative production as we know it—an argument that has not borne out in 
history.  Now, the new technology wars seem to signify something deeper, 
more ominous:  if left unchecked, copyright minimalism—roughly 
corresponding to broader users’ rights like fair use or broad liability shields 
like safe harbor laws—could threaten democracy as we know it, entrenching 
power, cementing inequality, and shielding market forces from the political 
process.9  This line of thought has been helped along by law and political 
economy scholarship, which has pointed to “copyleft” arguments and “other 
progressives skeptical of strong intellectual-property law . . . [as] help[ing to] 
further” antiregulatory ideals cloaked behind the veil of innovation policy—
ideals that led to Google’s meteoric ascent.10 
And thus, because copyright laws passed or developed at the infancy of 
the internet, such as § 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act11 
(DMCA) or the fair use doctrine, have allowed companies like Google to 
flourish, perhaps it is time to peel back these laws.12  Meanwhile, before the 
courts and the legislature, powerful, well-organized content holders, such as 
music publishing, record label, and software corporations, are harnessing just 
 
“not only permits tech companies to censor constitutionally protected speech but immunizes 
them from liability if they do so”). 
 7. See generally Mark Lemley & Mark McKenna, Unfair Disruption, 100 B.U. L. REV. 
71 (2020).  As the U.S. Supreme Court put it in a case involving the novel (at the time) VHS 
player:  “From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant 
changes in technology.” Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
430 (1984). 
 8. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 7, at 74–75. 
 9. See Amy Kapczynski, The Law of Informational Capitalism, 129 YALE L.J. 1460, 
1493 (2020); see also Jedediah Britton-Purdy et al., Building a Law-and-Political-Economy 
Framework:  Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1784, 1803 n.68, 
1804 (2020) (noting that “Google was a great driver and recipient of” the expansion in fair use 
doctrine, which in turn “set the stage for today’s extraordinary forms of platform power”). 
 10. Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 1493; see also id. at 1494 (arguments for the value of 
user-generated content “proved perfectly compatible with the emergence of platforms, 
including those like Google that offer much for free”). 
 11. 17 U.S.C. § 512; see infra Part I.A. 
 12. See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
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this type of argument to advocate for the weakening of the fair use doctrine, 
the termination of long-standing antitrust oversight of certain concentrated 
content holders, and an explicit license-or-staydown regime for technology 
platforms.13 
This Article argues that reshaping copyright in the anti-monopoly spirit 
will in fact have the exact opposite effect.  The seemingly compelling public 
narrative that laws must be rewritten to combat power by any means 
necessary ignores the uniqueness of copyright markets as one dominated not 
by diffuse, weak licensors bargaining with technology giants, but instead by 
large, oligopolistic content conglomerates.  Changes in copyright laws that 
increase the cost of content licenses not only fail to address, and indeed will 
only enrich, the long-standing dominance of traditional content licensors.  
They will also entrench and concentrate licensees, creating a bilateral 
oligopolistic market for copyrighted works.  And such changes will, 
ultimately, hasten the obsolescence of the very content industries that 
advocated for these reforms, as today’s licensees evolve to become 
tomorrow’s licensors. 
This Article is divided into four parts.  Part I provides a brief overview of 
the copyright laws, both statutory and common law, that proved deeply 
beneficial for growing internet companies, including the enactment of § 512 
of the DMCA, the expansion of the fair use doctrine, and certain consent 
decrees governing the musical performing rights organizations, such as the 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) (a 
performing rights organization that administers licenses on behalf of its 
songwriter-members)14 and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI). 
Part II looks at how our present era’s techno-pessimism has begun 
reshaping both the law and the rhetoric of our current copyright battles, 
beginning with the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market in 
Europe, which could serve as precedent for the United States’s own revisions 
of § 512, and the techno-pessimist rhetoric that is being harnessed by content 
holders in the courts and before the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to fight 
continuing regulation of concentrated content industries. 
Part III argues that, to the extent these new laws are rooted in antitrust-like 
arguments premised on Big Tech’s market power, they obscure the history 
of copyright ownership as one dominated by a few oligopolistic content 
companies.  Today, upstream competition amongst licensors has further 
decreased, as the large content conglomerates have become even more 
concentrated.  Meanwhile, downstream competition is increasing, as the cost 
of distributing content decreases and traditional content creators are 
increasingly becoming distributors. 
Part IV argues that using copyright law to address Big Tech dominance 
will have the opposite effect, creating a market dominated by a few 
entrenched, concentrated licensees negotiating with a few entrenched, 
 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See We Are ASCAP, ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/ [https://perma.cc/9234-FY32] 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2021). 
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concentrated licensors—a bilateral oligopoly.  In the final analysis, the more 
difficult and costly licensing creative content becomes, the more likely that 
technology companies will innovate around the problem, ultimately 
rendering traditional content production companies obsolete.  To fight 
monopoly, to be truly neo-Brandeisian, one must think beyond copyright 
law.15 
I.  THE COPYRIGHT LAWS THAT SHAPED TECH 
The best-known contemporary example of the law that built the internet is 
most likely § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which largely 
immunizes internet platforms from tort liability resulting from content posted 
by its users.16  Indeed, in his book The Twenty-Six Words That Created the 
Internet, Jeff Kosseff argues that “[i]t is impossible to divorce the success of 
the U.S. technology sector from the significant benefits of Section 230.”17 
What § 230 does not address, however, are instances in which the content 
posted by a user results in copyright infringement liability.18  But a law 
passed at the same time as § 230 did just that—serving as § 230’s copyright 
corollary.19  This part first discusses the so-called “safe harbor” provision in 
U.S. copyright law and then discusses several other laws that proved 
beneficial for the growth of new technologies. 
A.  Section 512 Safe Harbor 
Congress passed the DMCA to implement the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty.20  Among the DMCA’s provisions 
was § 512, often referred to as the “safe harbor.”21  Like § 230 did with user 
speech that may have resulted in tort liability, the § 512 safe harbor shields 
 
 15. While some scholars have linked earlier arguments for less intellectual property 
protection to the enablement of platform power, such accounts largely ignore the fact that 
copyright transactions necessarily will enrich one corporate power, whether it is a technology 
platform licensee (who may, through safe harbors, potentially be able to shield itself from 
copyright liability) or a content holder licensor (who may, through its own market power, 
demand supercompetitive license fees). See infra Part III.  In so doing, these accounts refuse 
to take a broader view of corporate power, concentrating instead on a handful of large 
technology firms, while failing to explain how, and if, the alternative to less protection will 
somehow lessen sources of power rather than, as I argue here, simply further entrench it.  
These critiques at times lament the expansion of intellectual property rights as empowering 
corporate rightsholders and privileging neoliberalism’s calls for greater internalization at the 
expense of consumers, while in other places arguing that a “minimalist” approach to 
intellectual property enabled “the development of troubling forms of private power.” 
Kapczynski, supra note 9, at 1494. 
 16. 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
 17. JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET 205 (2019). 
 18. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). 
 19. See 17 U.S.C. § 512; infra Part I.A. 
 20. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 440 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 21. Id. at 27. 
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internet platforms from copyright liability as a result of infringing content 
uploaded by its users, provided certain conditions are met.22 
Section 512’s legislative history acknowledges both the importance of a 
safe harbor for user freedom of expression and the prevention of internet 
platforms from being exposed to crippling infringement liability for the 
enormous amounts of data being transmitted or posted on their sites on a 
daily basis.  “In the ordinary course of their operations,” Senator Orrin Hatch 
reasoned, “service providers must engage in all kinds of acts that expose them 
to potential copyright infringement liability.”23  Thus, Senator John Ashcroft 
stated, “The notion that service providers should not bear the responsibility 
for copyright infringements when they are solely transmitting the material is 
one key to the future growth of the Internet.”24  A safe harbor allows the 
internet to “flourish,”25 while simultaneously ensuring that internet users’ 
“freedom of expression” is not “impinged upon.”26  “In short, by limiting the 
liability of service providers, the DMCA ensures that the efficiency of the 
Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services 
on the Internet will continue to expand.”27 
Notably, in passing the DMCA, Congress had considered—and 
specifically rejected—the content industry’s request that internet services 
instead go out and get licenses for the content its users made available on 
their sites.  Performing rights organizations such as ASCAP, which controls 
a large portion of performance rights in copyrighted musical compositions, 
specifically advocated for a licensing regime instead of a safe harbor, 
proposing that licensing would provide a workable middle ground to the 
“[safe harbor] legislation or [copyright infringement] lawsuit[]” dilemma 
Congress intended to address with § 512.28  But as congressional testimony 
by licensees demonstrated, licensing all the content made available on a 
service provider’s platform was simply unworkable.  Notably, while certain 
types of licenses were available on a “blanket” basis (for example, one 
 
 22. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (“A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, 
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement 
of copyright by reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or providing connections for, 
material through a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider . . . 
if . . . the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a person other than 
the service provider . . . .”). 
 23. 144 CONG. REC. 9234–35 (1998) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (explaining the need 
for and negotiations surrounding limits on online service provider liability). 
 24. Id. at 9238 (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft) (explaining that he pushed to address 
service provider liability in order to allow the internet to grow). 
 25. Id. at 25,811–12 (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte) (expressing satisfaction that the 
current version of the bill achieves balance between copyright holders and service providers). 
 26. Id. at 18,771 (statement of Rep. Barney Frank) (noting that this solution helps balance 
the rights of copyright holders and service providers). 
 27. See supra note 23. 
 28. WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability 
Limitation Act:  Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Cts. and Intell. 
Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, H. Reps., 105th Cong. 185–86 (1st Sess. 1997) 
(testimony of John Bettis, Songwriter, ASCAP Board of Directors) (debating whether a 
blanket license would be a workable alternative to judicial or legislative solutions to the 
problem of service provider liability). 
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license with ASCAP would grant a service provider all public performance 
rights for those musical works in ASCAP’s repertoire), many other 
copyrighted works—or even specific types of rights, such as the right to 
synchronize a musical composition with a film—would need to be licensed 
on an individual, work-by-work basis.29  Thus ultimately, and likely to the 
chagrin of the content industries, a licensing regime was rejected in favor of 
a safe harbor that exempts online service providers from infringement 
liability for the content made available by its users. 
After its passage, § 512 proved vital in the fortunes of several technology 
platforms.  Most notable among these is Google, which was sued by Viacom 
in 2007 for infringing content made available on YouTube (which Google 
had acquired) by YouTube users.30  The copyright owners had demanded 
statutory damages for “approximately 79,000 audiovisual ‘clips’ that 
appeared on the YouTube website between 2005 and 2008.”31  Because a 
court may, in its discretion, award statutory damages of up to $150,000 per 
copyrighted work,32 Viacom was, in theory, entitled to over ten billion 
dollars in damages.33  At the time the lawsuit was brought, Google’s profits 
across all its divisions (not just YouTube, which had been pulling in 
approximately fifteen million dollars in revenue, but not profits),34 while 
quite high, had only been a little over one billion dollars.35  A damages award 
that granted the copyright owners all that they were seeking would have 
potentially bankrupted Google alone, to say nothing of its one video-sharing 
division, YouTube.36  The resulting litigation, which lasted for seven years, 
ended in the district court finding in favor of YouTube based on § 512.37 
 
 29. National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act of 1995:  Hearing on 
S. 1284 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 15–16 (2d Sess. 1996) (response 
of Creative Incentive Coalition) (explaining why a blanket license would be unworkable). 
 30. See Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 31. Id. at 26. 
 32. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
 33. See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 26; see also Second Amended Class Action 
Complaint ¶ 151, Football Ass’n Premier League v. YouTube, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 159 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 07-cv-3582), 2008 WL 5596002 (seeking statutory damages “in the 
maximum amount permitted by law with respect to each work infringed”). 
 34. See Michael Arrington, YouTube Revenues:  $15 Million Per Year, or Per Month?, 
TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 6, 2007, 4:02 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2007/03/06/youtube-
revenues-15-million-per-year-or-per-month/ [https://perma.cc/N5XC-E4PK]. 
 35. See Miguel Helft, Google Profit Up 46%, Exceeding Estimates, N.Y. TIMES  
(Oct. 18, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/18/technology/18google-web.html 
[https://perma.cc/65F2-QQ76]. 
 36. A copyright damages verdict in the billions is not simply farfetched conjecture, nor 
should we expect a jury or a judge to exercise restraint in such awards.  For example, a jury 
recently awarded a coalition of Big Content music industry copyright owners one billion 
dollars in damages against the service provider Cox Communications—$99,830.29 for each 
work infringed, multiplied by a little over 10,000 works infringed—a paltry number compared 
to the number of works alleged in Viacom Int’l, Inc. See Sony Music Ent. v. Cox Commc’ns, 
No. 1:18-CV-00950, 2021 WL 1254683, at *1 (E.D. Va. Jan. 12, 2021). 
 37. See Viacom Int’l., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  
While § 512 undoubtedly provided a defense, and some bargaining leverage, to platforms 
hosting user-generated content, it is far from an absolute shield for copyright liability.  As I 
discuss in Part IV, far from allowing technology platforms to act as havens for wanton piracy, 
2021] COPYRIGHT'S TECHNO-PESSIMIST CREEP 1159 
While the Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. litigation is the most 
well-known example of how instrumental § 512 proved to be to internet 
platforms, it is certainly not the only one.  Other popular internet video 
platforms, such as Veoh and Vimeo, were also able to rely, with varying 
degrees of success, on the § 512 safe harbor to defend against copyright 
infringement claims brought by content companies.38  As Professor Matthew 
Sag wrote, “[t]he DMCA safe harbors have been a tremendous benefit to the 
U.S. copyright system and to the U.S. economy . . . .  [T]he internet safe 
harbors have propelled the growth of social networking and other ‘Web 2.0’ 
businesses.”39 
Content holders, unsurprisingly, were vocal about their hatred of the safe 
harbor and issued existential warnings about the coming death of culture in 
the face of the internet.  The president of then–Time Warner warned that the 
coming of the Internet Age would result in a “sort of cultural Dark Ages.”40  
Of course, these dire predictions were the same type of apocalyptic 
proclamations that the content industry would issue with any new 
technology, including the advent of the videotape.41  The debates 
surrounding the safe harbor and its importance to internet companies merely 
served as an exemplar for, and microcosm of, the content industries’ 
long-standing antagonism to technological disruption. 
Of course, just as content did not die with the videotape, it did not die with 
the growth of the internet.  Not only did private bargaining for copyright 
licenses continue under the DMCA, but culture also thrived, rather than 
 
the reality is that technology platforms, including YouTube, have nonetheless chosen (or, 
more likely, as a result of the uncertainty of continued safe harbor litigation) to enter into 
negotiated license agreements with content holders in the shadow of the DMCA. See infra 
Part IV. 
 38. See Capitol Recs., LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 99 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that 
the video-sharing platform Vimeo is eligible for safe harbor protection and thus is not liable 
for copyright infringement committed by its users); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Cap. 
Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1013, 1036 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the video-sharing 
platform Veoh is entitled to rely on § 512’s safe harbor and thus was not liable for copyright 
infringement of Universal Music Group’s copyrighted sound recordings). 
 39. Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 504–05 (2017). 
 40. JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 151 (2001) (noting that the president of Time 
Warner stated:  “This is a very profound moment historically.  This isn’t just about a bunch of 
kids stealing music.  It’s about an assault on everything that constitutes the cultural expression 
of our society.  If we fail to protect and preserve our intellectual property system, the culture 
will atrophy.  And corporations won’t be the only ones hurt.  Artists will have no incentive to 
create.  Worst-case scenario:  The country will end up in a sort of cultural Dark Ages”). 
 41. See id. at 106.  As Jessica Litman details, the executive secretary of the American 
Federation of Television and Radio Artists had testified before a House subcommittee in 1982 
on the perniciousness of the first sale doctrine, which shielded videotape rental businesses 
from copyright liability: 
Unless we do something to ensure that the creators of the material are not exploited 
by the electronics revolution, that same revolution which will make it possible for 
almost every household to have an audio and video recorder will surely undermine, 
cripple, and eventually wash away the very industries on which it feeds and which 
provide employment for thousands of our citizens. 
Id. at 106–07. 
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receding into the predicted Dark Ages as a result of online piracy conducted 
under the cloak of safe harbor laws.  Movie industry revenues rose.42  
Creative output increased:  the number of films, books, and music available 
to U.S. consumers has grown exponentially, not decreased, since the 
enactment of the safe harbor.43  And many of these changes were helped 
along in significant part by technology.44  Sites like YouTube and Twitch are 
producing new revenue streams for audiovisual content.  Empirical studies 
from the past decade show remarkable increases in not just industry revenue 
(as opposed to the precipitous declines and mass layoffs portrayed by content 
industries),45 but also in the quantity, quality, and diversity of cultural output 
being produced (lest anyone believe that the growth of the internet has merely 
resulted in a world awash in mediocrity—or, as one commentator put it, “No 
more Hitchcocks, Bonos,46 or Sebalds.”47).48 
B.  ASCAP/BMI Consent Decrees 
Whereas technology platforms governed by the § 512 safe harbor relied on 
user-generated content, other internet platforms—what I will call “mass 
 
 42. See JOEL WALDFOGEL, DIGITAL RENAISSANCE:  WHAT DATA AND ECONOMICS TELL US 
ABOUT THE FUTURE OF POPULAR CULTURE 73–105 (2018). 
 43. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act at 22:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, Subcomm. On Intell. Prop., 116th Cong. 1 (2020) (statement of Professor 
Rebecca Tushnet). 
 44. See Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 486–87 
(2015) (providing evidence that content industries have seen increased revenues and that more 
content is being created in the new Internet Age). 
 45. See Copyright Law in Foreign Jurisdictions:  How Are Other Countries Handling 
Digital Piracy?:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Intell. Prop., 
116th Cong. 1 (2020) (statement of actor Jonathan Yunger) (“For the past two decades, the 
plague of digital piracy has been stealing jobs from hardworking Americans.  The truth is that 
the battle against piracy has only intensified since the DMCA became law . . . .  Anything that 
could be distributed digitally online was stolen and monetized by criminals, facilitated by 
some of the world’s wealthiest Internet companies including Google, its now-sibling 
YouTube, and Facebook.”); Andrew Keen, Why We Must Resist the Temptation of Web 2.0, 
in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE:  ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 51, 54 (Brian Szoka 
& Adam Marcus eds., 2011) (“Newspapers are in freefall . . . .  Meanwhile, digital piracy, 
enabled by Silicon Valley hardware and justified by [Silicon Valley] intellectual property 
communists such as Larry Lessig, is draining revenue from established artists, movie studios, 
newspapers, record labels, and songwriters.”). 
 46. It is not entirely clear to this author whether Bono belongs in the pantheon of great 
culture. 
 47. See supra note 46. 
 48. Keen, supra note 45, at 55; see WALDFOGEL, supra note 42, at 163 (concluding that 
we are experiencing a digital renaissance in books, film, music, and television) (“In music, the 
number of new songs released annually has tripled, and top-selling lists are made up 
increasingly of songs from artists on independent labels . . . .  By some counts, the number of 
movies produced annually has increased by a factor of ten.  The annual number of new releases 
that are commercially available has increased by a factor of roughly five.  Independent movies 
make up a growing and large share of the critical darlings; and the number of critically 
acclaimed movies—for example, those scoring above 90 at Rotten Tomatoes—has grown 
from 10 to 100 per year.”); see also GLYNN LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS:  MONEY AND 
MUSIC IN THE US RECORDING INDUSTRY 158 (2018) (finding that more revenue to the music 
industry in fact results in fewer and lower-quality hit songs). 
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aggregation” technologies—could not rely on the § 512 safe harbor because 
the platforms, not the users, controlled the content.49  I refer to these as “mass 
aggregation” technologies because these innovations aggregate existing 
copyrighted content—text, images, music—to make the world’s culture 
instantly and easily accessible.  For example, Google Books does this with 
text.  Google Image Search does this with images.  And Pandora and Spotify 
do this with music.  But the strength of these services—making available vast 
quantities of text, images, or music—is also its very weakness as far as 
copyright law is concerned. 
A federal district court noted in a royalty rate dispute involving the digital 
radio service Pandora and copyright holder ASCAP that “the internet has 
enabled providers to present listeners with a vast library of radio 
programming, the likes of which has never been available before.”50  “With 
the internet, each listener’s device gets its own data stream, in contrast to the 
broadcasting of a common signal across a geographic area,” as would be the 
case with AM/FM radio.51  Pandora’s particular innovation in generating 
unique radio “stations” for each of its users was its Music Genome Project 
(MGP).52  Pandora had substantially invested in the MGP, hiring “[t]rained 
music analysts, many of whom have music related degrees or are musicians, 
[to] listen to the compositions . . . and register the composition in reference 
to as many as 450 characteristics.”53  Thus, Pandora users “seed” a station 
with a song, artist, genre, or composer that they enjoy, and Pandora then 
“draws upon the MGP to locate other compositions that the listener is likely 
to enjoy.”54 
Just like traditional radio stations, Pandora needs a license in order to 
publicly perform copyrighted musical works.  Due to the sheer number of 
songs that radio stations—to say nothing of digital radio stations like 
Pandora—have on rotation, performing rights organizations (PROs) like 
ASCAP offer “blanket licenses” that give licensees the right to perform all 
of the works in the PRO’s repertoire.55  As Judge Ralph K. Winter of the 
Second Circuit has noted, blanket licenses are efficient because they “reduce 
the costs of licensing copyrighted musical compositions.  They eliminate 
costly, multiple negotiations of the various rights . . . .  They also allow users 
 
 49. See 17 U.S.C. § 512.  Section 512 only provides that “service provider[s] shall not be 
liable for monetary relief . . . for infringement of copyright” for material stored or routed 
through their servers if “the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of 
a person other than the service provider.” Id. § 512(a)(1). 
 50. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d sub nom. 
Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 327. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 322. 
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of copyrighted music to avoid exposure to liability for copyright 
infringement.”56 
But for the same reasons that blanket licenses are efficient, the 
consolidation of so many musical works also presents serious 
anticompetitive concerns.57  Thus in 1941, the DOJ brought antitrust suits 
against both ASCAP and the other largest PRO, BMI.58  As a result of these 
lawsuits, BMI and ASCAP entered into consent decrees with the DOJ, which 
imposed certain limitations on both PROs.59  For example, the ASCAP 
decree subjects the PRO to the jurisdiction of certain “rate courts” sitting in 
the Southern District of New York so that licensees may apply to the rate 
court to determine a reasonable fee in the event an agreement cannot be 
reached between the parties.60  Likewise, and critically for companies like 
Pandora, the decree requires ASCAP to grant licenses on demand “to any 
music user making a written request therefor a non-exclusive license to 
perform all of the works in the ASCAP repertory.”61 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the consent decrees were unpopular with licensors 
for the same reason they are popular with licensees.  Music publishers, who 
are members of the PROs, had to grant licenses to anyone who requested 
one—and, in particular, they had to grant them to technology companies like 
streaming services.  Thus, in 2010, ASCAP and its large music publisher 
members, like Sony Music Entertainment, began to pursue a strategy known 
as “partial withdrawal,” where the publishers would withdraw from ASCAP 
the right to license works to so-called “new media” users.62  This meant that 
“new media” services—and only new media services (like Pandora)—would 
no longer be able to take advantage of ASCAP’s blanket license and would 
have to begin individually negotiating licenses with each copyright holder 
instead.  In other words, the very efficiencies of blanket licensing that gave 
 
 56. Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 744 F.2d 917, 
934 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., concurring). 
 57. See Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. MobiTV, Inc., 681 F.3d 76, 
82 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that “ASCAP, as a monopolist, exercises market-distorting power 
in negotiations for the use of its music”). 
 58. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1940–43 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 1940–43 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56,098 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).  The consent decrees have been modified throughout 
the years.  The current governing versions of the consent decrees are Second Amended Final 
Judgment, United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 41-1395, 
2001 WL 1589999 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001) [hereinafter ASCAP Amended Judgment] and 
Amended Final Judgment, United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., No. 64 Civ. 3787, 2000 WL 
280034 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2000) [hereinafter BMI Amended Judgment]. 
 59. See ASCAP Amended Judgment, supra note 58; BMI Amended Judgment, supra note 
58. 
 60. See ASCAP Amended Judgment, supra note 58, at *6–8. 
 61. Id. at *4; see also id. at *7 (providing that, in the event the parties cannot agree upon 
a reasonable fee for the license, “the music user shall have the right to perform any, some or 
all of the works in the ASCAP repertory to which its application pertains, without payment of 
any fee or other compensation” while pending rate court review). 
 62. See In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d sub nom. 
Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
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rise to licensing collectives like ASCAP in the first place would be 
unavailable to new technologies.63 
Pandora sought relief in the rate court, arguing that the consent decrees 
prohibited partial withdrawal and seeking the determination of a reasonable 
royalty fee in lieu of what it argued was a far-above-market rate reached 
outside the protections of the consent decrees.64  Judge Denise L. Cote held 
that the consent decrees prohibited publishers from “partially withdrawing” 
their works.65  In other words, either publishers could engage in direct 
licensing negotiations with every licensee—whether that be a restaurant or 
Pandora—or, if publishers wished to take advantage of the collective 
efficiencies of ASCAP, then they needed to comply with the provisions of 
the consent decrees, including their all-comers provisions.66 
The district court further found that the benchmark rates negotiated with 
Sony and Universal Music Group, which were negotiated outside of the 
protection of the consent decrees, were not competitive, fair market rates.67  
The district court had previously defined fair market value as a license fee 
arrived at in an arm’s length transaction.68  Both ASCAP and Pandora agreed 
on a definition of fair market value, defining it as the rate “at which a willing 
and unrelated buyer would agree to buy and a willing and unrelated seller 
would agree to sell . . . when neither party is compelled to act, and when both 
parties have reasonable knowledge of the relevant available information.”69  
The reasonable fee that the district court itself set after extensive fact-finding, 
1.85 percent of Pandora’s revenue, was far lower than the market-negotiated 
rates of 3.42 percent (Universal) and 2.28 percent (Sony).70  Describing the 
rate drop of over 50 percent from the rate Sony and Universal were able to 
obtain by partial withdrawal, the court noted:  “ASCAP did not show that the 
upshot of the negotiations conducted by either Sony or [Universal’s 
publishing arm] with Pandora was a competitive, fair market rate.”71  In other 
words, the court took seriously the music publishers’ threat that they had the 
power to “shut down” Pandora72—and viewed this as evidence that so-called 
 
 63. See Buffalo Broad. Co. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 744 F.2d 
917, 934 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., concurring). 
 64. In re Pandora Media, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 8035, 2013 WL 5211927, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
17, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & 
Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 65. Id. at *11. 
 66. Id. at *1. 
 67. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. at 357–58. 
 68. Id. at 353 (citing Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers v. MobiTV, Inc., 
681 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
 69. Id. at 354 (alteration in original) (citing ROBERT W. HOLTHAUSEN & MARK E. 
ZMIJEWSKI, CORPORATE VALUATION:  THEORY, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE 4–5 (2d ed. 2014)). 
 70. Id. at 372.  The court described the rate Universal had negotiated for itself as a 
“leap . . . so astounding that it drove Pandora to buy a radio station and to file a summary 
judgment motion challenging the legality of” partial withdrawal. Id. at 360–61 (emphasis 
added). 
 71. Id. at 372. 
 72. Id. at 359 (describing Pandora as having “three options:  shut down its business, face 
crippling copyright infringement liability, or agree to Sony’s terms” (citation omitted)). 
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“marketplace” negotiations conducted outside the protections of the consent 
decrees were anything but fair. 
But with new changes brought about by the Orrin G. Hatch-Bob Goodlatte 
Music Modernization Act73 (MMA), passed in 2018, as well as changes 
likely to come to the consent decrees, Judge Cote’s opinion will likely be 
remembered as a vestige of a different era.74  Whereas changes brought about 
by the MMA will almost certainly result in rate courts handing down higher 
royalties,75 changes to the consent decrees, discussed in Part II, could mean 
that digital services no longer get the benefit of blanket licenses at all. 
C.  Fair Use 
Perhaps the best known of all of copyright’s defenses, fair use allows 
others to use copyrighted works—without payment to or permission from 
copyright holders—in certain instances, “such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.”76  As the doctrine 
developed in the common law, “courts consistently expressed preference for 
secondary uses that did not merely copy and offer themselves as substitutes 
for the original copyrighted text,” but instead that used copyrighted works in 
the creation of new works—what Judge Pierre N. Leval called “productive” 
uses.77  “[R]eproductive” uses, or ones where the copyrighted work was 
merely copied for some other purpose or in some other medium, were 
disfavored.78 
Of course, most cases79 in which new technologies reproduced 
copyrighted works were by nature ones where reproductive, rather than 
productive works, were at issue.  New technologies, such as the VCR, the 
photocopier, the internet search engine, and the computer, may have changed 
the way that a copyrighted work was viewable, searchable, or transmitted, 
but they did not use copyrighted works in the creation of new, creative 
expression. 
 
 73. Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 17, 19, and 28 U.S.C.). 
 74. See infra Part II.B. 
 75. See infra Part II.B. 
 76. 17 U.S.C. § 107.  As Neil Netanel pointed out to me in an email, language from the 
House report suggests that § 107 may have been contemplated to extend to new technologies 
like Google Books or Google Image Search. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976) (“The 
bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, but there is no 
disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid 
technological change.”). 
 77. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 11, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) 
(“Texaco’s copying is not of the transformative, nonsuperseding type that has historically been 
favored under the fair use doctrine.”). 
 78. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1114–16 
(1990). 
 79. But not all.  Notably, new technologies also enabled users to cut, copy, and paste 
copyrighted works like digital bricolage, incorporating them into their own creative 
expression. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016).  Often, these 
cases were decided, at least in part, on the basis of the § 512 safe harbor. 
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But fair use proved to be an important nexus in which the age-old battle 
between content owners and new technologies played out.  As Justice John 
Paul Stevens put it in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,80 
the first new technology case that put fair use to the test, “[f]rom its 
beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant 
changes in technology.”81  But, as Justice Stevens pointed out, courts had 
historically been deferential to Congress when evaluating new technological 
innovations that fundamentally change how copyrighted materials are 
consumed, sold, or transmitted.82  The subsequent decision in Sony Corp. of 
America, then, was remarkable in nonetheless applying the judicially 
developed fair use doctrine to hold that home taping of copyrighted materials 
on VCRs for purposes of “time shifting” (fast forwarding) constituted fair 
use.83 
Sony Corp. of America may have been the first decision to apply fair use 
to a new technology’s reproduction of a copyrighted work, but it was not the 
last.  Two notable fair use decisions involving Google applied the doctrine to 
hold that both mass aggregation and mass digitization of copyrighted 
works—again, without payment and without a license—could be permissible 
under copyright law.84  The first, a 2007 Ninth Circuit decision, involved 
Google Image Search.85  Google’s Image Search functionality returns 
thousands of thumbnail images from all over the web in response to user 
queries.86  Many of these thumbnails may be of copyrighted images.87  
Notably, Google did not hold a license from any of the copyright owners who 
held rights in the images. 
The Ninth Circuit determined that Google’s Image Search functionality 
constituted a fair use.88  “Google’s use of thumbnails is highly 
transformative,” the court held, noting that the functionality provided a great 
benefit to the public by creating an “electronic reference tool” for images.89  
Critically, the fact that Google also profited off Image Search through the use 
of targeted advertising did not outweigh the “significantly transformative 
nature of Google’s search engine, particularly in light of its public benefit.”90 
The Ninth Circuit’s fair use finding was in effect a zero-fee compulsory 
license to Google.91  This finding was critical to Google Image Search’s 
 
 80. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 81. Id. at 430. 
 82. Id. at 431. 
 83. Id. at 454–55. 
 84. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 229 (2d Cir. 2015); Perfect 10, Inc. 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 85. See Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1155 (explaining the mechanics of Google Image 
Search). 
 86. See id. at 1155. 
 87. See id. at 1157. 
 88. Id. at 1168. 
 89. Id. at 1165. 
 90. Id. at 1166. 
 91. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-But-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1383, 1385 (2014) (noting that in cases such as Perfect 10, Inc., “the user is not only 
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continued viability, and not just because a finding of infringement would 
have entitled the rightsholder to seek injunctive relief.92  Even if a court chose 
to deny injunctive relief, as it is permitted to do after the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,93 Google would be vulnerable 
to infringement lawsuits from every single rightsholder whose image appears 
in the Google Image Search functionality—which is to say, Google would 
have been subject to, quite literally, millions of infringement lawsuits.94 
Several years after the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in Perfect 10, Inc. 
v. Amazon.com, Inc.,95 the Second Circuit issued its own fair use finding on 
another Google technology, Google Books.96  Google Books was a mass 
book digitization project that Google launched in connection with several 
major research libraries.97  In connection with the project, Google scanned 
over twenty million books in order to create its electronic database.98  On top 
of that, Google made this database text-searchable.99  Users of the tool can 
search the entire library and view excerpts, or snippets, from these books—
including from books that had long gone out of print.100 
 
dispensed from obtaining permission, but also owes no compensation for the use”).  And a 
compulsory license is just that:  the rightsholder does not have the right to say “no.” 
 92. For further reading about the problem of fair use as an “on/off switch” in which a 
finding that a use is not fair would entitle a “copyright owner [to] stop the use,” see id. at 1385. 
 93. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  eBay Inc. held, in the patent context, that injunctions should not 
automatically be granted once infringement is found. Id. at 394.  Courts have subsequently 
applied eBay Inc. to copyright infringement lawsuits, as well. See, e.g., Salinger v. Colting, 
607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 94. See Mark A. Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 70 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 198 (2007) (noting that Google Books, if it lost the fair use defense, 
would be liable for up to 300 billion dollars in statutory damages).  Note that Perfect 10 made 
its images available through a password-protected portal. See Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 
1157.  These images were not included in Google Image Search; rather, the images at issue 
were those made available by third-party websites that had republished Perfect 10’s images 
without its authorization. See Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1157.  Perhaps this suggests that 
some sort of opt-in/opt-out system could be created in which copyright holders who do not 
want their content made available on Google Image Search could simply protect their content 
via password protection, as Perfect 10 had done.  Those copyright holders who do not similarly 
lock down their content by password are, in effect, granting an implied license.  However, 
courts have not been historically receptive to this argument—and for good reason, as use of 
password protection or other web protocols (for example, a web protocol excluding web 
crawlers) cannot distinguish between uses and access that a copyright holder may wish to 
permit (for example, indexing for purposes of search engine rankings) and those that it wishes 
to disallow (for example, copying of images). See Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. 
Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding no implied license where 
copyright holder failed to employ a web protocol that excludes web crawlers, because there is 
no “meeting of the minds between the copyright owner and the owner of the web crawler” as 
to what uses the copyright holder is granting access to). Associated Press, 931 F. Supp. at 563.  
In any event, because the images at issue here were made available by third parties, not Perfect 
10, even this opt-in/opt-out system would not work. See Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, 
Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 801 (2007). 
 95. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 96. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 97. Id. at 208. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 209–10. 
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In holding that Google’s digitization and display of copyrighted material 
constituted fair use, the district court found that the “benefits of Google’s 
book project are many.”101  The court noted:  “Books will become more 
accessible.  Libraries, schools, researchers, and disadvantaged populations 
will gain access to far more books.”102  “Digitization” would also “facilitate 
the conversion of books to Braille and audio formats, increasing access for 
individuals with disabilities.”103  Authors, too, would benefit, because “new 
audiences will be generated and new sources of income created.  Older 
books—particularly out-of-print books, many of which are falling apart 
buried in library stacks—will be preserved and given new life.”104  The 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of fair use, finding both 
the search and snippet view functions “highly transformative.”105 
This part has detailed how a combination of legislation and common law 
fostered the growth and viability of services like YouTube, Vimeo, Google 
Images, and Google Books.  These technology platforms offer users the 
ability to express themselves, to upload that self-expression, to watch others 
as they engaged in acts of identity and meaning-making, and to access the 
world’s culture as if pulling books—or images, or music—off an infinite 
shelf.  Law worked in tandem with technology to change the conditions of 
cultural production, in a way that copyright scholars argued was valuable—
because digital technologies made “the values of a democratic culture salient 
to us,” in that it “offers the technological possibility of widespread cultural 
participation,” giving “ordinary people a say in the progress and development 
of the cultural forces that in turn produce them.”106  But perhaps it is now 
difficult to even speak of Google or YouTube in such positive terms.  If 
legislation and common law had unwittingly helped Google along—by 
allowing it to take others’ content without permission or payment under the 
auspices of fair use or by creating a statutory ceiling through the safe harbor 
that gives it unfair bargaining leverage as against copyright holders—might 
it be time we reformed our copyright laws to rein Google, Facebook, and 
Amazon back in?  As Part II discusses, a number of changes or contemplated 
changes to copyright laws aim to do just that. 
 
 101. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 229.  For an argument that a class action settlement would 
be in fact a better remedy than fair use, as it would provide copyright holders who opt into 
digitization with compensation and an opt-out mechanism for copyright holders who do not 
wish for their books to be digitized, see Xiyin Tang, Copyright Class Actions and Blanket 
Licensing by Litigation (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 106. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture:  A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 35, 37 (2004) (emphasis added). 
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II.  COPYRIGHT’S TECHNO-PESSIMIST CREEP 
If certain copyright statutes, doctrines, and blanket licenses promoted the 
development of internet platforms, recent changes in the laws are working to 
scale back the excesses of the internet companies that benefitted the most 
from these regimes.  Like the conversations currently happening around 
§ 230,107 the most prominent copyright law to undergo scrutiny and reform 
in the past year is the § 512 safe harbor.  This part first discusses how changes 
in European copyright laws that removed safe harbor protection for most 
technology platforms could serve as precedent for ongoing conversations 
surrounding safe harbor reform in U.S. copyright law, before discussing how 
techno-pessimist sentiment is shaping the rhetoric being wielded by 
rightsholders to their advantage. 
A.  Safe Harbor Reform and Closing the Technology “Value Gap” 
On April 17, 2019, the European Parliament adopted a sweeping reform to 
EU copyright laws.108  Titled the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single 
Market Directive (DSM), the DSM drastically changed how technology 
companies like Google or Facebook do business.  Specifically included in 
the DSM was Article 17,109 which effectively gutted safe harbor protection 
for certain online platforms, requiring that services which make available a 
large amount of user-generated content—services like Google and 
Facebook—affirmatively go out and get licenses for all copyrighted content 
its users share on the platform before any such content may be posted.110  The 
DSM is, essentially, the opposite of § 512, as it holds platforms responsible 
for the infringements of their users and the myriad content containing 
potentially copyrighted material posted by them.111 
The motivation behind this inversion of traditional copyright liability rules 
was precisely the perceived market power of online platforms.  According to 
European policy makers, copyright holders lacked bargaining leverage when 
negotiating with them.  The DSM thus “gives publishers and authors the 
means to negotiate better with digital platforms,” putting rightsholders “in a 
stronger and fairer position to negotiate and be paid when a platform puts 
their work online.”112  In many ways, this argument echoes the sentiment 
voiced by many outside the copyright space—for example, by retailers who 
 
 107. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Council Directive 2019/790, 2019 O.J. (L 130) (EU) [hereinafter DSM]. 
 109. Note that this Article omits discussions of Article 15, which requires technology 
platforms to pay news organizations for displaying snippets of their copyrighted articles, 
because it deserves its own robust scholarly analysis.  My preliminary analysis, however, is 
that a service provider’s conscious decision to display “snippets” of news articles (as opposed 
to just the link), which is almost always likely to be copyrighted by a third party, likely falls 
outside of the ambit of safe harbor protection and thus would require a license. 
 110. DSM, supra note 108, art. 17. 
 111. Id. 
 112. European Commission Press Release, SPEECH/18/3124, Speech by Vice-President 
Ansip on Copyright at the Charles Clark Memorial Lecture, London Book Fair (Apr. 10, 2018) 
[hereinafter Press Release]. 
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have long complained that, because they are reliant on a platform like 
Amazon for their business, they lack any leverage against the technology 
giant.113 
To further cement the idea that safe harbor laws unfairly create one-sided 
licensing negotiations in favor of digital platforms, rightsholders coined a 
term that quickly rose in favor among lawmakers and the general public:  the 
“value gap.”114  While originally a term of art unique to the music industry, 
the term “value gap” came to symbolize everything and anything wrong with 
the perceived dominance of technology platforms against the powerlessness 
of rightsholders. 
Originally a record industry term, the “value gap,” strictly speaking, refers 
to the difference in rates by a service like YouTube,115 which can rely on the 
safe harbor,116 and a service like Spotify that cannot (because Spotify itself, 
rather than the users, posts the content).117  The term, then, merely speaks to 
a fundamental truth about statutory rates—rates are always going to be lower 
when negotiated under the shadow of a statute, hence why the term “statutory 
ceiling” exists.  For example, in the music publishing—as opposed to record 
label—context,118 rightsholders have long complained of what they 
perceived as an unfair gap between music publishing revenues, which are 
regulated by both the § 115 mechanical license and the ASCAP/BMI consent 
decrees,119 and record label revenues, which are unregulated (except for, of 
 
 113. See Charles Duhigg, Is Amazon Unstoppable?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/10/21/is-amazon-unstoppable 
[https://perma.cc/F4YR-7GYN].  One producer who has refused to sell his products on 
Amazon describes the platform as “own[ing] the marketplace.” Id.  That producer continued, 
“[t]hey can do whatever they want”—in a move that isn’t even “capitalism” but, as he 
describes it, in the ultimate language of the IP maximalists, “piracy.” Id. 
 114. See Annemarie Bridy, The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”:  How the Music 
Industry Hacked EU Copyright Reform, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 323 (2020). 
 115. In 2019, Google merged its interactive streaming service, Google Play, into YouTube, 
under the confusing names YouTube Music and YouTube Premium. See Julian Chokkattu and 
Abigail Bassett, YouTube Music Is Replacing Google Play Music:  Here’s Where, When and 
Why, DIGITALTRENDS (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.digitaltrends.com/music/what-happens-to-
google-play-music-youtube-music/ [https://perma.cc/JS6S-H7FP].  Any discussion of 
“YouTube” in this Article excludes the interactive streaming component.  But I note here that, 
while the exact license agreements are confidential, it has been publicly reported that 
YouTube’s interactive streaming component pays in fact much higher per-stream rates than 
other interactive streaming services like Spotify. 
 116. Notably, however, YouTube has instead chosen to enter into content licenses with 
rightsholders. See Sag, supra note 39, at 541–42 (terming the agreements that YouTube has 
entered into with rightsholders in the shadow of the DMCA as “DMCA-plus” agreements). 
 117. See INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., IFPI DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2015, at 
23 (2015) (“The key to addressing the ‘value gap’ is to create a fair licensing environment.  
Currently, this does not exist.  This is because certain content platforms (that is services such 
as YouTube and Dailymotion) claim that they are merely neutral hosting services entitled to 
benefit from exemptions to copyright law (akin to internet service providers), rather than 
digital distribution services akin to Deezer or Spotify, which do not benefit from such 
exemptions.”). 
 118. There are two copyrights underlying every song:  a musical composition copyright, 
which is usually owned by music publishers, and a sound recording copyright, which is usually 
owned by record labels. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7). 
 119. See supra Part I.B. 
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course, by any applicable safe harbors).120  In fact, in this context, 
rightsholders have lauded agreements negotiated with YouTube as “model 
agreements,”121 while simultaneously deriding services like Spotify, which 
can take advantage of the statutory § 115 rate and thus, pay less.122 
But of course, as the example above shows, a gap between statutory rates 
and rates negotiated outside of any applicable statutes have nothing to do 
with the market power of technology platforms.  Spotify possesses 
considerably less market power than tech titan Google.  But because, in the 
music publishing context, Spotify can take advantage of the § 115 license 
and YouTube’s audiovisual content cannot,123 rates negotiated with 
YouTube outside of the statutory shadow are higher.  If the safe harbor 
creates lower rates, it does so for any platform eligible for the safe harbor—
everything from lesser-known websites like Dailymotion to tech giants like 
Google.124 
Soon enough, however, as the term “value gap” began to gather 
momentum with lawmakers and the public, earlier attacks on any platform 
that could avail itself of statutory rates—including websites like 
Dailymotion—fell away.  Instead, the term “value gap” took on a new 
meaning:  rather than refer to the difference between technology platforms 
that paid statutory rates and technology platforms that had to negotiate 
market rates, the term instead pitted the immense wealth of technology 
platforms against the content holders who had long suffered unfair returns.125 
The United States is now actively reconsidering its own safe harbor laws.  
While the Copyright Office’s recently concluded study of § 512 did not 
recommend any major changes to the statute, there is now a fervent and 
renewed legislative interest in reforming the statute.126  In addition to holding 
a series of hearings on § 512,127 members of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property have asked a series of follow-up 
questions to the Copyright Office about how § 512 can be reformed, 
 
 120. See Written Direct Statement of Copyright Owners at 21, Determination of Rates and 
Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords III), 84 Fed. Reg. 1 (Oct. 28, 
2016) (No. 16-CRB-0003-PR) (“[T]he statutory [§ 115 mechanical license] rate often acts as 
a ceiling on what can be achieved in direct negotiations undertaken in the shadow of the 
compulsory license.”). 
 121. Id. at 5. 
 122. Id. at 27. 
 123. See Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing 
Phonorecords (Phonorecords III), 84 Fed. Reg. 1918, 1941 (Copyright Royalty Bd. Feb. 5, 
2019) (final rule and order) (content owners’ expert selected a YouTube contract as a 
benchmark “because neither the musical works license nor the sound recording license is 
subject to the § 115 license”). 
 124. See id. 
 125. See European Commission Press Release MEMO/19/1151, Questions & Answers:  
EU Negotiators Reach a Breakthrough to Modernise Copyright Rules (Feb. 13, 2019) 
(describing how Article 17 will close the “value gap” and enable creators to finally be 
remunerated fairly for their works). 
 126. See text accompanying supra note 13. 
 127. See supra notes 43, 45 and accompanying text. 
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including a specific inquiry into the workability of a “notice and staydown” 
regime128—the very same phrase that has been used to describe the DSM.129 
As former European Parliament member and Harvard’s Berkman Klein 
Center researcher Julia Reda notes, there is good reason to believe that 
similar changes could be coming to U.S. copyright law.  “There is a 
tried-and-tested tradition of Hollywood companies lobbying for stricter 
copyright in Europe, just to turn around to US policy-makers to demand the 
same extensions be enacted in domestic law,” Reda writes.130  This was 
precisely what happened with one of the most controversial U.S. Copyright 
Act amendments, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,131 which 
extended copyright terms by an additional twenty years.132 
With interest coalescing around reforms to § 230, which, like § 512, treats 
service providers as neutral conduits, the continued viability of the safe 
harbor in its current form is very much in question.  Indeed, just months after 
the Copyright Office concluded its § 512 study, Senator Thom Tillis released 
his own discussion draft for reforming the safe harbor in late December 
2020.133  Among the revisions Senator Tillis included in the draft was 
replacing the current notice-and-takedown system with a 
notice-and-staydown system.134  Professor Rebecca Tushnet, at a hearing on 
§ 512 reform, was quick to point out the natural corollary between the 
growing chorus of voices on both the left and the right that are calling for the 
reform of § 230 and the increased scrutiny on § 512:  “The two issues are 
very much connected . . . .  They’re both under pressure, and opponents of 
 
 128. Letter from Senators Thom Tillis and Patrick Leahy, to Maria Strong, Acting Reg. of 
Copyrights and Dir. (May 29, 2020). 
 129. See Bridy, supra note 114, at 353–54. 
 130. Julia Reda, Why Americans Should Worry About the New EU Copyright Rules, 
BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://medium.com/berkman-klein-center/why-
americans-should-worry-about-the-new-eu-copyright-rules-97800be3f8fc 
[https://perma.cc/7Q5Q-ECFZ]. 
 131. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 17 U.S.C.). 
 132. Id.  The Senate report for the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act provides 
that it was meant to “harmoniz[e] U.S. copyright law to that of the European Union.” S. REP. 
NO. 104-315, at 3 (1996).  Almost as soon as the Act was passed, it was challenged in court 
(Larry Lessig represented the plaintiffs), a challenge that the Supreme Court ultimately 
rejected. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  For a discussion of how this term 
extension harms U.S. copyright law, see James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and 
the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 40 (2003) 
(discussing how “lengthening the copyright term . . . can be understood as a vote of 
no-confidence in the productive powers of the commons”). 
 133. See Press Release, Sen. Thom Tillis, Tillis Releases Landmark Discussion Draft to 
Reform the Digital Millennium (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2020/12/tillis-
releases-landmark-discussion-draft-to-reform-the-digital-millennium-copyright-act 
[https://perma.cc/7PUS-UENQ]. 
 134. 12/18 Discussion Draft For Stakeholder Comments Only, THOM TILLIS  
(Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/services/files/97A73ED6-EBDF-4206-ADEB-
6A745015C14B [https://perma.cc/C6EQ-CTAK]. 
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both tend to lump a bunch of bad things together.”135  Practitioners, likewise, 
agreed that “[t]he DMCA discussion and the [Section] 230 discussion are 
related; there’s no question about that.”136  And just as public sentiment 
swung from believing that § 230 provided much-needed immunity to the 
internet to a newfound conviction that it was the very law that helped Big 
Tech grow to unparalleled dominance, so too the public sentiment has shifted 
toward a deep antipathy toward safe harbor reform.  As one lawyer who 
represented technology platforms in the original § 512 negotiations decades 
ago acknowledged bluntly, “the political terrain has changed.”137  Why else, 
then, would the Walt Disney Company and the Motion Picture Association 
focus on lobbying lawmakers to overhaul § 230, which has little to do with 
copyright?  Again, as Professor Tushnet pointed out, “it’s about messaging:  
By drumming up opposition against one of big tech’s key legal shields, rival 
industries hope that momentum will bleed into a new fight targeting the tech 
industry’s protections against copyright liability.”138 
Just like the Copyright Office study, which others, like Professor Pamela 
Samuelson, have critiqued as being almost single-handedly in favor of 
content owners,139 Senator Tillis’s proposed draft legislation makes no 
pretense of attempting to balance the rights of service providers against 
content owners.  Instead, Senator Tillis has been clear that reforms to § 512 
are necessary “to better encourage the creation of copyrightable works”—in 
other words, to better serve the needs of content owners.140 
But when we remove safe harbors, we in fact skew licensing negotiations 
solely in favor of content holders, who have the power of copyright 
infringement suits—including injunctive relief and crippling statutory 
damages—as the ultimate leverage.  Some, like Professor Mark Lemley, 
have called the arsenal of remedies that infringement suits afford copyright 
holders supracompensatory, because statutory damages can far exceed actual 
damages and a copyright user can be forced to completely cease all infringing 
activity, meaning that ultimately, infringement suits threaten users with 
remedies far above paying a market-rate license.141  In part because of the 
uncertainty created by injunctive relief and supracompensatory damages, 
companies like YouTube may nonetheless choose to enter into agreements 
with content holders, even if they could technically choose to rely on the 
zero-price safe harbor instead.  The threat of years-long, million-dollar 
copyright litigation—to say nothing of the possibility of billions of dollars in 
damages exposure—already severely curtails any bargaining leverage 
 
 135. Press Release, Sen. Thom Tillis, Copyright Liability Emerges as Latest Threat to Big 
Tech’s Legal Shield (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2020/2/copyright-liability-
emerges-as-latest-threat-to-big-tech-s-legal-shield [https://perma.cc/JW9C-AANJ]. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Pushing Back on Stricter Copyright ISP Liability 
Rules, 27 MICH. TECH. L. REV. 299 (2021). 
 140. See Press Release, supra note 133. 
 141. See Lemley, supra note 94, at 196–97. 
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created by the safe harbor.142  Removing safe harbors entirely creates 
one-sided licensing negotiations—in favor of content owners.143 
Finally, as Part I noted, there is little truth to the suggestion that the content 
industry is an industry hobbled by the growth of digital and reduced to 
receiving paltry sums for copyrighted works.  Content industry revenues are 
in fact up.144 
B.  Reshaping the Law and Rhetoric of Copyright in Techno-Pessimism’s 
Image 
Just as “value gap” took on new power when retooled as a term about the 
inequalities engendered by Big Tech, so too did rightsholders begin to see 
the rhetorical power in reshaping other parts of copyright law as 
fundamentally about combatting platform dominance. 
One such example manifested itself in public arguments and written 
submissions made by the National Music Publishers’ Association (NMPA) 
(the main trade association for music publishers and songwriters) before the 
DOJ.145  Unsurprisingly, following the court rulings prohibiting partial 
withdrawal under the consent decrees discussed in Part I, the NMPA began 
advocating to modify the consent decrees altogether—to allow precisely for 
partial withdrawal for digital platforms.146  The NMPA’s renewed focus on 
advocating for carving new media companies out of the consent decrees came 
at a time when Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim had already 
voiced hints at coming reforms to the decrees—in late 2019, the DOJ opened 
a new investigation into the continued need for the consent decrees and called 
for public comments.147 
In response, the NMPA filed a response that, in its first introductory pages, 
seized upon the powerful narrative of unequal wealth that had dominated the 
debates surrounding Article 17.  New media companies, the NMPA argued, 
 
 142. See Sag, supra note 39, at 541 (“[A]lthough the safe harbors are working well for 
some platforms, others find that they are not as safe as they had hoped.  To mitigate this 
uncertainty, a number of platforms that host large quantities of music and audio-visual works 
have agreed to go beyond the requirements of the DMCA and proactively filter user content 
in an effort to reduce infringement and to appease rightsholders.  Most obviously, YouTube’s 
development of Content ID appears to have been spurred by the Viacom litigation that began 
almost as soon as Google acquired the video-sharing company in 2006.”). 
 143. The DSM’s exemption of services with revenues of under ten million dollars per year 
does not ameliorate the problem, as copyright infringement exposure for relatively new 
upstarts, as YouTube had been when it was sued by Viacom, easily exceeds this threshold. 
See infra Part IV.A. 
 144. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.  While illegal digital platforms like 
Napster had decimated industry revenues back in the early aughts, these are not the types of 
platforms protected under the safe harbors that the DSM takes aim at. See A&M Records, Inc. 
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d, 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 145. NAT’L MUSIC PUBLISHERS’ ASS’N, “SELECTIVE WITHDRAWAL” OF NEW MEDIA RIGHTS 
FROM ASCAP AND BMI (2019) [hereinafter NMPA Submission]. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Antitrust Consent Decree Review—ASCAP and BMI 2019, DEP’T OF JUST.  
(Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-consent-decree-review-ascap-and-bmi-
2019 [https://perma.cc/9VM5-TY94]. 
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“are much larger and more powerful than the music licensees who were the 
intended beneficiaries of the ASCAP and BMI consent decrees.”148  
Harnessing the language of techno-pessimism and its rhetoric of platform 
dominance and monopoly power, the NMPA writes:  “The music distribution 
market today is dominated by companies that are exponentially larger than 
the music publishing industry as a whole, including Google, Amazon, and 
Apple, each of which has the resources and the size to negotiate licenses 
directly with copyright owners and often does so.”149  (Never mind, of 
course, that one of the biggest beneficiaries of the consent decrees is Spotify, 
a company whose name is not (yet) synonymous with techno-pessimist 
antitrust regulation and, therefore, presumably, not cited in this discussion of 
market dominance.)150 
The NMPA went on to cite the yearly revenue that Google, Amazon, and 
Apple bring in, noting that they make “hundreds of billions in yearly revenue 
and have a combined market capitalization that exceeds $2 trillion.”151  
Never mind, of course, that this is across every single product line, from 
Google Maps to Amazon Web Services (which alone brings in over 
thirty-five billion dollars in revenue per year)152—product lines that have 
nothing to do with the streaming of music and thus are entirely severable 
from whether these companies want to continue with the business of music 
streaming as a viable business model, at all. 
While the DOJ ultimately concluded that the consent decrees should not 
be modified, including to permit “partial withdrawal,” for the current 
moment,153 there is reason to believe that copyright law is headed 
increasingly toward carveouts for new technologies.  Indeed, the recently 
passed MMA may well serve as precedent for partial withdrawal, as it 
requires only digital services like Spotify and Google to pay a different—
almost in all likelihood higher—royalty rate for the public performance of 
sound recordings.154  The resulting royalties under the MMA will be 
determined according to a “willing buyer/willing seller” standard, which 
scholars agree will almost certainly result in higher rates than the previous 
801(b) policy-based standard, which permitted an adjustment downward of 
 
 148. NMPA Submission, supra note 145, at 3. 
 149. Id. at 4–5. 
 150. Spotify is a prominent member of the Digital Media Association, the trade group that 
submitted comments to the DOJ warning against partial withdrawal. See ASCAP/BMI 
CONSENT DECREE REVIEW, JOINT PUBLIC COMMENTS OF RADIO MUSIC LICENSE COMMITTEE 
AND DIGITAL MEDIA ASSOCIATION (2019), https://media.justice.gov/vod/atr/ascapbmi2019/ 
pc-619.pdf [https://perma.cc/JD5E-6LRY]. 
 151. NMPA Submission, supra note 145, at 16–17 (emphasis omitted). 
 152. See Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Form (Form 10-K), at 67 (Dec. 5, 2019). 
 153. See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Statement of the Department of Justice on 
the Closing of the Antitrust Division’s Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (Jan. 
15, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1355391/download [https://perma.cc/4GCZ-
LF49]. 
 154. Pub. L. No. 115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 17, 19, and 28 U.S.C.); see Kristelia A. Garcia & Justin McCrary, A Reconsideration of 
Copyright’s Term, 71 ALA. L. REV. 351, 404–405 (2019). 
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rates for a digital platform’s technological contributions.155  As compared to 
the previous 801(b) policy-based rate, a willing buyer/willing seller standard 
is closer to a market-based standard and makes no such accommodations for 
the benefits of new modes of distribution.156  If anything, the rhetoric of the 
overwhelming power and wealth that technology companies hold will 
continue to be wielded, at times to availing effect, by rightsholders seeking 
increased payouts from an unsympathetic licensee. 
Finally, the dissent in the recently issued Supreme Court decision Google 
LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.157 gives a window into how techno-pessimism 
can reshape fair use doctrine, which has historically been the only 
common-law doctrine in copyright flexible enough to allow technologically 
transformative uses of copyrighted works.  In this closely watched case, 
Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement of Oracle’s API packages—
prewritten source code programs that allow programmers to build certain 
functions into their own programs (rather than writing new code from 
scratch).158  In reversing the Federal Circuit’s decision that Google’s use was 
not fair, the majority in Oracle America, Inc. focused on the functionality of 
Oracle’s code, holding that the “code is, if copyrightable at all, further than 
are most computer programs . . . from the core of copyright” and thus entitled 
to only a thin scope of copyright protection.159 
Thus, while the decision ultimately turned on the unique nature of the 
copyrighted work at issue—largely functional computer code—the dissent 
previews how a fair use case pitting a copyrighted work closer to the “core” 
of protection (books, films, music) against a major technology company 
could come out very differently.  While the majority focuses in great detail 
on factor two of the fair use analysis, which looks to the nature of the 
copyrighted work (in this case, highly functional),160 the dissent focused in 
on factor four—the market harm suffered by Oracle.161  “By copying 
Oracle’s work, Google decimated Oracle’s market and created a mobile 
operating system now in over 2.5 billion actively used devices, earning tens 
of billions of dollars every year,” wrote Justice Thomas.162  “If these effects 
on Oracle’s potential market favor Google, something is very wrong with our 
fair-use analysis,” he concluded.163 
Notably, while the Federal Circuit’s decision below had likewise focused 
on the market harm factor in its holding that Google did not make fair use of 
 
 155. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b); see Jacob Victor, Reconceptualizing Compulsory Copyright 
Licenses, 72 STAN. L. REV. 915, 961, 989 (2020). 
 156. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b); see Victor, supra note 155, at 976. 
 157. 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021). 
 158. Id. at 1190. 
 159. Id. at 1202. 
 160. Id. at 1202–04. 
 161. See id. at 1215 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The fourth factor—the effect of Google’s 
copying on the potential market for Oracle’s work—is ‘undoubtedly the single most important 
element of fair use.’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 566 (1985))). 
 162. Id. at 1218. 
 163. Id. 
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Oracle’s copyrighted work, the Federal Circuit was somewhat oblique in its 
reasoning on this factor, leading several IP scholars to comment that “the 
Federal Circuit ignored controlling Ninth Circuit law and found that Oracle 
suffered market harm in a market it was unlikely to enter and despite the fact 
that Google copied only a tiny fraction of Oracle’s code.”164  Likewise, in 
reversing the Federal Circuit and holding that Oracle was unlikely to suffer 
market harm, the Court noted that the jury had found that the copyright holder 
itself was unlikely, and indeed poorly positioned, to enter the mobile phone 
market.165 
By contrast, the dissenting members of the Court were far blunter in their 
reasoning as to why Google should be found to have caused Oracle to suffer 
market harm.  “Google . . . recently was fined a record $5 billion for abusing 
Android to violate antitrust laws,” wrote Justice Thomas, citing a European 
Commission finding.166  “If the majority is worried about monopolization, it 
ought to consider whether Google is the greater threat.”167  In other words, if 
we want to combat the growing threat of tech monopolies, we cannot allow 
already enormously wealthy parties like Google to benefit further from the 
zero-fee defense of fair use.  This simple and intuitive reductionism 
condenses the multi-factor fair use analysis to a single question:  can the 
defendant afford to pay?  But, in doing so, it poses enormous harm to all fair 
use cases, most of which do not involve an unsympathetic and wealthy 
defendant, because in every fair use case, the defendant could, theoretically, 
have gotten a license instead.  The very reason fair use exists is precisely 
because a use that is fair does not require a license.168  If rightsholders can 
reshape fair use reasoning in techno-pessimism’s image, the doctrine risks 
falling into the dangerous circularity that copyright scholars have long 
warned of.169 
Oracle America, Inc. was unique because it concerned a type of 
copyrighted work (software) long accorded a narrower scope of 
protection.170  But in a typical fair use case, unlike in Oracle America, Inc., 
 
 164. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 7, at 120. 
 165. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. at 1206. 
 166. Id. at 1217–18 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. at 1218. 
 168. See Lemley, supra note 94, at 191 (noting that the lost licensing theory of fair use, in 
which any use in which defendant can afford to pay is one that cannot be fair, threatens to 
“contract the doctrine of fair use to a few protected categories, with the baseline assumption 
being that any use requires permission and a licensing fee”). 
 169. See, e.g., id.; 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 13.05 (Matthew Bender ed., 2020). 
 170. See, e.g., Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1348 (5th 
Cir. 1994) (explaining that the highly functional nature of computer user interfaces means that 
they “may lie very near the line of uncopyrightability”); Paul Goldstein, Infringement of 
Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1119, 1125 (1986) (describing computer 
software as accorded a “very thin” level of protection); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto 
Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2351 
(1994) (arguing that computer program behavior should not be accorded any copyright 
protection). 
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factor two is rarely dispositive.171  Instead, factor four—the market harm 
factor—is often considered the most important fair use factor.172  And if the 
dissent’s honing in on the defendant’s dominance in the market harm analysis 
is a harbinger of things to come, it suggests a powerful opening for copyright 
holders—who often wield vast monopoly power—to turn the lens away from 
their own dominance and toward the dominance of the defendant technology 
platform.  They can point to ongoing antitrust investigations or concluded 
ones, as the dissent aptly did in Oracle America, Inc., conveniently erasing 
the fact that copyright holders possess enormous market power.  That power 
is often wielded to stop legitimate competition that threatens their very 
dominance—while reshaping the long history of content holders’ antagonism 
to disruption and innovation, reframing it as, somehow, a heroic, 
public-minded stand against Big Tech.173  Part III examines the long history 
of content holder market power and whether it has significantly weakened in 
the past decade with the rise of large technology platforms. 
III.  MARKET POWER, ANTITRUST, AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
These days, “antitrust violation” and “Big Tech” are seen together so often 
in buzzy headlines that the two terms have become almost interchangeable, 
one simply synonymous and proof-positive of the other.  But copyright law 
is unique and different from other types of market transactions, because those 
negotiating against powerful technology platforms are often not diffuse 
parties with little bargaining power.174  Many are, instead, concentrated 
oligopolies that enjoy market dominance of their own.  This part first 
summarizes the history of certain large content holders’ market power in 
copyright transactions, before examining whether the rise of digital has 
significantly changed this traditional landscape. 
 
 171. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 586 (2008) (explaining that in an empirical analysis of three-plus 
decades of fair use opinions, factor two was “shown to exert no significant effect” on the 
outcome of the fair use analysis). 
 172. See id. (describing empirical data showing that “the first and fourth factors are shown 
each to exert an enormous amount of influence on the outcome of the test, with the fourth very 
much in the driver’s seat”). 
 173. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 7, at 119–20. 
 174. Of course, this statement cannot apply to each and every copyright industry.  
Certainly, many of them—photography, journalism, fine art—are, indeed, small and diffuse 
parties with weak bargaining power.  That journalism, in particular, may face a threat from 
the dominance of technology platforms is significant.  As I noted, this Article does not take 
up Article 15 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, which requires digital 
platforms to compensate news outlets for providing “snippets” of their articles.  For a rich and 
thoughtful discussion of this topic, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Mandating Digital Platform 
Support for Quality Journalism, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 473 (2021).  This Article merely 
focuses on large copyright industries that, unsurprisingly, drive much of the copyright policy 
in the United States—notably, the music and film industries. 
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A.  A History of Content Holder Oligopolies 
A significant portion of the copyright industry is controlled by a 
staggeringly small number of players.  Much of rights ownership, far from a 
diffuse web of interests spread out amongst individual creators, artists, and 
authors, is instead concentrated in a handful of large corporations that, 
together, drive copyright policy in the United States.175  While just a few 
copyright sectors—the motion picture, recorded music, publishing, and 
software industries176—dominate copyright policy internally, each of these 
sectors also “face the oligopolist dominance of a handful of firms.”177 
Of course, by its very nature, intellectual property rights create limited 
monopolies.  Copyright holders, whether Universal Music Group or a 
hobbyist photographer, enjoy market power because they are able to charge 
higher than a competitive price for a given good or service.178  Thus, where 
copyright holders enjoy monopoly pricing and do not own a copyright in their 
work, the relevant question is not whether the market is competitive (since it 
cannot be) but instead how workably competitive the market is.179  
“Workable competition” does not require marginal cost pricing—which is 
impossible because copyright rewards producers for the cost of creating the 
first, not subsequent, copy180—but requires that copyright holders merely 
compete with each other on pricing.  If downstream licensees have the ability 
to choose between several works that, while not perfect substitutes, are 
approximate substitutes, then licensors could compete with each other over 
pricing to attract buyers or licensees.  But if licensors do not have the ability 
to substitute because each copyrighted work is a “must have” work for 
purposes of the licensee’s end product, then copyright holders enjoy market 
power and will charge supracompetitive prices for their works.181 
 
 175. See generally LITMAN, supra note 40 (describing the various industries that got a seat 
at the bargaining table of major copyright legislation—notably, the recorded music, motion 
picture, and publishing industries). 
 176. See id. at 126 (the motion picture industry, the recorded music industry, book 
publishers, and software companies together represented all copyright content owners in 
legislative reform of the Copyright Act for the new digital age). 
 177. NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 132 (2008). 
 178. See id. at 128–29. 
 179. See generally J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. ECON. 
REV. 241 (1940). 
 180. See NETANEL, supra note 177, at 124 (“When the good is a book, the marginal cost 
would equal the cost of printing and distributing one more copy.  In the case of text on a Web 
site, the marginal cost would be virtually nothing—only the negligible cost of transmitting the 
text over the Internet to one more user.  In neither event would marginal cost reflect the 
author’s ‘first-copy’ costs, the investment in creating the text that is to be distributed.”). 
 181. Indeed, the copyright mechanical license, § 115, specifically regulates music 
publishers like public utilities. 17 U.S.C. § 115.  In advocating that creative industries should 
not be subject to regulation like “railroad systems” or “streetcar lines,” the NMPA had argued 
that “[m]onopoly and public utility aspects are just not prevalent in [the music publishing and 
songwriting] industry.” Hearings on S. 597 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and 
Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 383 (1967) (statement of Robert R. 
Nathan, Robert R. Nathan Associates, Inc.).  Yet, it was the opposing position of the 
licensees—that in fact music publishers do act like public utilities—that ultimately formed the 
basis for the mechanical license. See Victor, supra note 155, at 978. 
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Copyright scholars studying this issue a decade ago had concluded that the 
market for copyrighted works lacked approximate substitutes because 
consumer demand clustered around a small number of works182—think Top 
40s hits, Hollywood blockbusters, books on the top of The New York Times 
Best Sellers lists.  And indeed, because consumers “wish to convey, refer to, 
critique, learn from, or reformulate” a select number of “culturally seminal” 
works—and where using commonly understood signifiers as reference 
points, those shared points of knowledge bear more cultural force than 
referring to or reformulating obscure or unknown works—the market for 
expressive goods, these scholars posited, may in fact be less competitive than 
markets for many other products.183 
That the market for copyrighted works is not workably competitive is 
further exacerbated by a second, related problem:  concentration among 
sellers or copyright holders.  Writing in 2008, Professor Neil Weinstock 
Netanel warned that: 
[The] copyright industries that dominate public discourse have reached 
levels of concentration that are deleterious to both competition and 
expressive diversity.  As of this writing, four major labels control some 85 
percent of the U.S. record industry market . . . six major studios 
consistently garner well over 80 percent of domestic box office market 
share, and ten publishing houses enjoy oligopoly domination of the trade 
and paperback book markets.184 
These two issues—(1) consumer demand clustering around a small 
number of works and (2) concentration among copyright holders—are not a 
story unique to the twenty-first century.  While the specific names may have 
changed, the story has remained much the same throughout the past century.  
Criminal antitrust prosecutions against NBC and CBS, along with musical 
works organizations ASCAP and BMI, created the consent decrees in the 
1940s.185  The original complaints filed against ASCAP and BMI centered 
around the fact that both musical works owners controlled the repertoires to 
an immense number of copyrighted works, requiring each licensee to either 
“accept a license from the [collective] upon any terms and conditions 
imposed by the Society or subject themselves to numerous infringement 
suits.”186 
B.  The Digital Age:  Some Things Change, but Much Stays the Same 
The pertinent question, then, is whether the rise of Big Tech and the 
subsequent shift to digital modes of consumption have fundamentally shifted 
this long history of content holder market power in these dominant industries.  
It may be tempting, after all, to conclude that technology has fundamentally 
 
 182. See NETANEL, supra note 177, at 131. 
 183. See id. 
 184. Id. at 144. 
 185. Turner Catledge, ASCAP, Radio Chains To Be Prosecuted as Music ‘Trusts’, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 27, 1940, at 1, 12. 
 186. Id. 
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changed things.  But not only does recent evidence from marketplace 
negotiations dispute this intuition,187 other developments—the further 
consolidation of firms within the dominant copyright sectors, a shift in 
consumer demand toward greater interactivity and larger catalogs, and the 
decreased costs of distribution leading to vertical integration within content 
firms—all suggest that there has been no significant weakening of content 
holder market power. 
1.  The Marketplace for Copyrighted Goods Is Becoming More 
Concentrated 
Since 2008, the music industry has further consolidated, resulting in only 
three major labels and publishers, with the merger of Universal and EMI on 
the record label side and Sony and EMI on the music publishing side.  
Notably, Universal, in connection with its proposed merger with EMI, 
specifically asserted to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that “the 
proposed merger would not lessen competition because the market for 
interactive [streaming] services was already not competitive.”188  In 2016, 
record label executives confirmed in testimony before the Copyright Royalty 
Board (an administrative panel tasked with setting rates for certain types of 
streaming services) that there was an effective lack of price competition in 
the market for their copyrighted works, stating that they had “never lowered 
a proposed [license] rate as a consequence of finding out that another Major 
[label] was offering a lower rate.”189 
In the motion picture industry, the six major Hollywood studios are now 
five, as the Walt Disney Company purchased Twentieth Century Fox, its 
smaller but still threatening rival, in a move that is not unlike the Big Tech 
acquisitions that antitrust regulators had vowed to undo around the exact 
same time that the FTC approved the merger.190 
Across these dominant copyright industries, that an effective lack of price 
competition exists among copyright holders is both confirmed and 
exacerbated by the use of most-favored nation (MFN) clauses in content 
license agreements.191  MFNs generally provide that if another, comparably 
 
 187. See supra Part II.B. 
 188. Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral Recording and Webcasting 
Digital Performance of Sound Recordings (Web IV), 81 Fed. Reg. 26,316, 26,342 (Copyright 
Royalty Bd. May 2, 2016) (final rule and order) [hereinafter Web IV].  Unfortunately, most of 
the documents submitted by Universal to the FTC in connection with its proposed, and later 
approved, merger are confidential.  The Web IV opinion redacts large portions of these 
statements. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See Matthew S. Schwartz, Disney Officially Owns 21st Century Fox, NPR (Mar. 20, 
2019, 6:17 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/20/705009029/disney-officially-owns-21st-
century-fox [https://perma.cc/ASQ7-8TMT]. 
 191. See Micah Singleton, This Was Sony Music’s Contract with Spotify, VERGE  
(May 19, 2015, 10:15 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/5/19/8621581/sony-music-
spotify-contract [https://perma.cc/L7BZ-TUK8] (“Having an MFN clause in a contract is 
standard for music licensing contracts, according to multiple sources.  MFNs have garnered 
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sized licensor receives more favorable terms, those terms must be matched 
across the board to all other comparably-sized licensors.192  MFNs facilitate 
horizontal collusion by fixing prices for copyrighted works at the 
highest-negotiated price.193  At least one large copyright industry—the book 
publishing industry—has been investigated for potential antitrust violations 
by the DOJ for the use of MFNs.194 
2.  Shifting Consumer Demand Means Less Upstream Competition 
In some copyright industries, marketplace concentration among sellers 
(copyright holders) is further exacerbated in a digital age where the 
proliferation of user-generated content and on-demand, interactive streaming 
services require making available a large amount of content owned by a small 
number of firms as their value propositions.  In music, the Copyright Royalty 
Board has recognized that the catalogs of major labels are “must haves,” not 
substitutes, because licensees need the catalog of each copyright owner to 
run a viable interactive service.195 
Indeed, even rights owners themselves have acknowledged that the more 
interactive a service is—the more control a consumer has, whether in the 
form of selecting something on-demand or choosing a song to incorporate 
into a video—the more likely it is that content becomes a “must have.”196  
And this is because the very point of these technologies is to make the entire 
universe of content—or as close to an approximation thereof—available to 
users, either to use as building blocks (in the case of user-generated 
platforms) for speech or to dramatically increase the availability of, and 
access to, copyrighted works.  To these aggregators of content, copyrighted 
works are complements, not approximate substitutes.  And the easier it 
becomes for users to access works, the higher users’ expectations are that, 
for example, a Google Image Search result will contain all the relevant 
images they need and that a Spotify subscription will get them access to 
almost all the music they want, and the more digital services must adapt to 
that consumer demand by offering as many copyrighted works as possible. 
 
scrutiny in the past, and as part of its merger with EMI in 2012, Universal Music Group had 
to stop using the clauses in Europe for 10 years.  But they remain legal in the US.”). 
 192. See, e.g., id. (reporting that Sony’s MFN clause in its license agreement with Spotify 
“essentially makes every major aspect of the contract amendable if any other label has a better 
deal or interpretation of that aspect than Sony Music”). 
 193. See Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal Consequences:  
Competitive Effects of “Most-Favored-Customer” Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 517, 525 
(1996) (explaining how MFNs facilitate horizontal collusion); Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing 
Without Collusion:  An Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 
WIS. L. REV. 887, 901–02, 932–35 (explaining how MFNs enable coordination by penalizing 
discounting). 
 194. See Complaint, United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), 
aff’d, United States v. Apple, Inc. 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 577 U.S. 1193 
(2016). 
 195. See Web IV, supra note 188, at 26,373. 
 196. Id. 
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Take Pandora as an example.  Pandora previously only offered a 
noninteractive radio service that made it somewhat (but not completely) 
easier for the platform to “steer” users toward content that Pandora wanted 
them to listen to—for example, Katy Perry instead of Taylor Swift, if they 
did not have rights to Taylor Swift’s repertoire.  Still, content owners have 
admitted that “the repertoire of each of the three Majors is a ‘must have’ in 
order for a noninteractive service [like Pandora] to be viable.”197  But just a 
few years ago, Pandora decided to introduce an interactive product.198  
Pandora justified its introduction of an interactive service on the basis that 
users were demanding interactive, on-demand functionality—functionality 
like the ability to pick any song they wanted on demand or the ability to 
replay a song.199  Pandora’s consumer research indicated that listeners likely 
left Pandora at the moment they experienced a feature limitation (what is 
called a “pain point”).200  Pandora concluded that: 
[T]he absence of these additional [interactive] features on Pandora’s 
service was hurting our product and our ability to maximize our appeal to 
our listener base.  This lack of functionality was inhibiting growth in 
listener hours, contributing to a decline in monthly users, and limiting our 
ability to attract new customers who wanted this additional 
functionality.201 
3.  Fragmentation in the Content Streaming Market Means Content Holders 
Can, and Do, Walk Away 
In other dominant copyright industries, while upstream competition 
among licensors has decreased,202 downstream competition among licensees 
has dramatically increased.  Data shows that Netflix’s market share for 
over-the-top video streaming, for example, has drastically dropped—from 91 
percent in 2007 to only 19 percent in 2019.203  Whereas content owners a 
decade ago balked at the notion of starting their own streaming services, 
choosing instead to rely on the traditional model of an intermediary 
distributor, advances in technology over the past decade have allowed for any 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. See Introductory Memorandum to the Written Statement of Pandora Media, Inc., In 
re Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords 
(Phonorecords III), 84 Fed. Reg. 1918, 1927 (Copyright Royalty Bd. Feb. 5, 2019). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Witness Statement of Christopher Phillips ¶ 13, In re Determination of Royalty 
Rates and Terms for Making and Distributing Phonorecords (Phonorecords III), 84 Fed. Reg. 
at 1927. 
 201. Id. ¶ 14. 
 202. See supra Part III.B. 
 203. See Travis Clark, Netflix Is Still Growing Wildly, But Its Market Share Has Fallen to 
an Estimated 19% as New Competitors Emerge, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 24, 2020, 8:27 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/netflix-market-share-of-global-streaming-subscribers-
dropping-ampere-2020-1 [https://perma.cc/DF8S-JZGR] (“Netflix’s global market share of 
over-the-top streaming video subscriptions has dropped from 91% in 2007 to 19% [in 
2019].”). 
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content owner to be able to also be a distributor.204  These days, almost every 
producer of content—from Disney to HBO to Showtime to ESPN to CBS—
has become a distributor through the creation of dedicated streaming 
channels.  And this trend is not limited to the audiovisual space.  Music 
streaming, too, has become increasingly more competitive, as the 
proliferation of new entrants result in an ever-more fragmented market.205 
Robust downstream competition means licensors have greater walk-away 
power than ever before, as an increasingly fragmented market means no one 
single distributor dominates the market as one once may have back when 
streaming delivery mechanisms were in their infancy.  Even YouTube is no 
longer the video streaming giant it once was, as internet users are gravitating 
toward other platforms like Twitch, TikTok, and Instagram.206  Perhaps the 
testimony of a music industry executive before the Copyright Royalty Board 
put it best:  “If a service were to say we’re just not going to play your records 
because it costs too much, the reality is we can go—we have other 
choices.”207 
Content holders’ increasing moves to make their content exclusively 
available on their own streaming platforms further evidences that technology 
companies are far from essential platforms for the distribution of creative 
content, both because of the proliferation of distributors (Spotify, YouTube 
Premium, Pandora Plus, Tidal, Apple Music, Rhapsody—just to name a few 
in the music streaming space) and because content holders can themselves 
become distributors.208  Disney, for example, pulled content from its 
previous distribution deals with Netflix and Hulu to make that content 
exclusively available on its own streaming platform.209 
 
 204. See Lucas Shaw, Hollywood Studios Can’t Quit Netflix—Even If They Want To, L.A. 
TIMES (May 30, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-netflix-hollywood-
studios-programs-20190530-story.html [https://perma.cc/X4XT-F3V9] (describing how film 
companies such as Disney and NBCUniversal are increasingly creating their own streaming 
services but are still bound by prior deals with Netflix to offer their content on Netflix’s 
platform for years to come). 
 205. See Mark Mulligan, Music Subscriber Market Shares H1 2019, MIDIA (Dec. 5, 2019), 
https://www.midiaresearch.com/blog/music-subscriber-market-shares-h1-2019 
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“snippets” of their articles. DSM, supra note 108.  Note that content holders, in advocating 
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 209. See Julia Alexander, Every Part of Disney Is Making Exclusive Content for the 
Disney+ Streaming Service, VERGE (Feb. 5, 2019, 5:45 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/ 
2/5/18212646/disney-streaming-service-price-release-date [https://perma.cc/2G5J-B95U]. 
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In this story, “pain points” only run one way.  A distributor needs as much 
content on its platform as possible, because every service limitation, whether 
in the form of limited interactivity, or limited catalog, creates a “pain point” 
for the service—consider Spotify’s long, concerted campaign to woo Taylor 
Swift back onto its service, as the CEO himself repeatedly went to Nashville 
to cajole Swift’s team.210  But the fragmentation of streaming services means 
content creators have choices—other services and, in many instances, their 
own streaming platform.  At least as far as cultural production and 
dissemination by users is concerned, the internet is a work in progress; 
today’s YouTube is tomorrow’s TikTok—at least, for now.  But, as Part IV 
of this Article argues, if new entrants are no longer entitled to safe harbors, 
if they are forced to confront confusing and costly licensing laws, or if they 
are faced with enormous start-up costs even before they know exactly what 
their business model will look like, what kind of content their users wish to 
share, or what kind of content will prove valuable to the service, the future 
may look very different. 
IV.  THE MISGUIDED APPEAL OF REGULATING BIG TECH BY COPYRIGHT 
As a handful of technology platforms have risen to unprecedented power, 
recent scholarship has lamented the unwitting role that copyright minimalism 
played in that ascent, citing some of the same laws—the safe harbor and fair 
use—that this Article describes in Part I.211  Yet, if these laws “set the stage 
for today’s extraordinary forms of platform power,” then that same 
scholarship has stopped short of arguing that the solution is to pivot away 
from them—for example, shrinking the scope of fair use so defendants like 
Google can no longer rely on it.212  And absent from these accounts is the 
inevitability that countering the previous decade’s overly optimistic 
copyright minimalism by expanding rightsholders’ protections enriches and 
empowers neither individuals nor consumers but large content holder 
conglomerates who have benefitted the most from expansive intellectual 
property laws.  This part examines why recent efforts to scale back the same 
laws that enabled the growth of technology platforms will only intensify 
monopoly power, rather than lessen it.  To combat the entrenchment of power 
and dominance, and to be truly neo-Brandeisian in an era where today’s Big 
Tech licensee is tomorrow’s copyright holder, one must think beyond 
copyright law. 
 
 210. See Luke Morgan Britton, Spotify Boss Explains How He Convinced Taylor Swift to 
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A.  Regulating Big Tech by Copyright Will Create a Bilateral Oligopoly 
If, as the argument goes, licensees like Google benefitted from lenient safe 
harbor laws that allowed it to grow unchecked off the backs of free content, 
then turning these laws in the other direction to raise licensing costs will not 
have the opposite effect.  Only dominant firms can use content as a loss 
leader, subsidizing the high cost of licenses with other product and business 
lines.  And ultimately, those that cannot afford to do so—or even perhaps 
those that can—will find ways to innovate around the cost, rendering the 
traditional content license wholly obsolete. 
1.  Expensive Licenses Create Entrenched, Concentrated Licensee Markets 
Requiring technology platforms to obtain expensive licenses for 
user-generated content or requiring technology platforms to pay more for 
licenses would further entrench, rather than enfeeble, dominant firms like 
Apple and Google.213  These companies can, after all, use content as a loss 
leader, subsidizing the high cost of content licenses with their other business 
lines, so long as they decide there’s a business justification for doing so.  For 
example, copyright holders have argued previously that Amazon gives away 
music for free in order to lure more subscribers to its Prime service.214  
Likewise, copyright holders have also complained that Apple uses 
copyrighted music to sell more iPhones.215  The net effect of using content 
as a loss leader is that comparatively smaller entrants are kept out of the 
market—even ones we think of as “large,” like Spotify, which did not turn a 
profit for the first decade or so that it was in business.216 
Recognizing that high content-licensing costs could keep smaller entrants 
out of the market, Article 17 was revised prior to its adoption to include a 
carveout for services that are less than three years old and that generate less 
than ten million euros in revenue per year.217  Yet, the mere cost of putting 
in place a system to detect the posting of unauthorized content, such as 
Google’s Content ID, exceeds that threshold by a factor of ten218—to say 
nothing of the cost of licensing content, which could cost a midsize company 
like Spotify three billion dollars in annual royalties.219  A company that finds 
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itself making eleven million euros in revenue per year could suddenly be 
subjected to ten times that amount in copyright licensing and enforcement 
costs. 
Only the technology firms that are too big to fail, and only the technology 
firms that can offset the high cost of copyright royalties with multiple other 
product lines or immensely profitable ecosystems, will take on the 
exorbitantly expensive, confusing, and time-consuming process of licensing 
content.  As one commentator noted about Article 17, “rightsholders’ 
concerns about YouTube’s clout are almost single-handedly driving an effort 
to write into law a technical hurdle that would appear to make YouTube 
almost singularly competition proof.”220  The overall end result will be a 
market dominated by a select handful of firms, as upstarts who may otherwise 
have come up with a new way to deliver content are either shut out of the 
market, because it is simply too cost-prohibitive to enter, or are forced to sell 
a business that can never turn a profit, leading exactly to the type of 
acquisitions that neo-Brandeis-school antitrust scholars have criticized as 
harming overall consumer welfare.221  If services like Spotify were 
previously able to operate even at heavy losses, it was because they were 
relying on venture capital cash.222  But there is reason to believe that as 
investors become more wary of subsidizing unprofitable businesses, the new 
economic environment will no longer reward risky business propositions like 
Spotify.223 
With further consolidation in the market due to higher licensing costs, 
licensors’ fears that a handful of firms will be able to better dictate licensing 
negotiations will become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  The current streaming 
market is already seeing a consolidation of services as continuously 
unprofitable ones exit or are acquired.  Pandora was recently acquired by 
Sirius XM.224  Live365, formerly a large internet webcaster, shut down its 
 
overall operating loss of $378 million.  It specifically warned investors that, if it could not 
“successfully earn revenue at a rate that exceeds the operational costs, including royalty 
expenses, associated with [its] Service, [it] will not be able to achieve or sustain profitability 
or generate positive cash flow on a sustained basis.” Spotify, Registration Statement (Form F-
1), at 17 (Feb. 28, 2018). 
 220. See Wolfe, supra note 213, at 1173. 
 221. See WU, supra note 4, at 124. 
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 223. See How Covid-19 Could Impact Startup Funding, CB INSIGHTS (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.cbinsights.com/research/coronavirus-startup-funding/ [https://perma.cc/MGD7-
7TZW] (projecting the decline in private market funding in the first quarter of 2020 to be the 
second steepest quarterly decline in the past ten years). 
 224. See Jem Aswad, Sirius XM Completes Acquisition of Pandora, VARIETY (Feb. 1, 2019, 
9:43 AM), https://variety.com/2019/biz/news/sirius-xm-completes-acquisition-of-pandora-
1203125882/ [https://perma.cc/TK5K-6KCB].  Notably, Pandora’s royalty rates as a digital 
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service specifically due to increased sound recording royalties set by the 
Copyright Royalty Board.225  Square, the mobile payment services company 
owned by billionaire Twitter founder Jack Dorsey, completed its acquisition 
of a majority stake in Tidal just earlier this year.226  As one industry watcher 
put it, “[i]t would be a sign of an unhealthy market if the only remaining 
digital music services are those owned by larger companies content to 
subsidize their music subsidiaries while generating profit elsewhere in the 
businesses.”227 
2.  Expensive Licenses Will Encourage Licensees to Innovate Around the 
Problem 
If companies do not exit the market due to untenably high royalty costs, 
they will instead attempt to innovate around the problem—by reducing their 
reliance on content licenses.  Professors Kal Raustiala and Christopher 
Sprigman, for example, have detailed how licensees have already begun to 
innovate around the problem of high licensing costs by creating their own 
content.228  Netflix and Amazon are acting as movie and television 
production studios.229  Spotify is acting as a quasi-record label, 
commissioning songs from unknown producers under fake names for a 
fraction of the cost of other licensed content.230  If paying for content licenses 
becomes a losing business proposition, then perhaps the only way forward 
will be for licensees to head toward a future where no licenses are required 
at all.  The licensees will become the licensor—the content creator and the 
distributor one and the same.  By making content licenses more expensive, 
and by requiring licenses for user-generated content, content holders may 
enjoy greater profits in the short run—but at the risk of far fewer licenses in 
the long run. 
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Throughout all of this consolidation in the market, consumers of culture 
will ultimately suffer.  The dominant platforms in the space, YouTube and 
Facebook, will increasingly act as gatekeepers and censors instead, as they 
are required to under Article 17, using content identification systems to 
censor and filter out speech that may be identified by opaque computer 
algorithms as infringing—even where they may be protected fair uses.231  
Cultural production, increasingly controlled by a few consolidated players 
and driven by algorithmic identification, will be self-reinforcing.  Copyright 
law, in its drive to punish big technology conglomerates, will simply create 
bigger, even more pernicious, technology conglomerates—Disney on 
streaming steroids. 
It is noteworthy that, in justifying the decision to sell Fox’s entertainment 
division to Disney, Fox explained that it was motivated by “fear, opportunity 
and pragmatism.”232  The fear comes from—what else but the “[f]ear of the 
seemingly bottomless wallets of Netflix, Amazon and possibly Apple to 
spend on new shows.”233  In other words, as “Big Content” has argued, the 
further consolidation of Big Content is necessary in order to fight Big Tech.  
Our creative universe may soon look like Goliath v. Goliath, a handful of 
large companies with infinite resources facing off against each other in some 
quest for cultural domination.  Our copyright law, if it rises to the 
techno-pessimist challenge, will only further perpetuate this race to the 
bottom. 
B.  Correcting the Creep 
These days, the early optimism of “commons-based production”—
uploading GarageBand songs on YouTube and sharing mash-ups and memes 
on social media—has given way to the deep pessimism that such naive belief 
in the transformative power of what Professor Lawrence Lessig called “remix 
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 232. Schwartz, supra note 190. 
 233. Id. 
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culture”234 “proved perfectly compatible with the emergence of platforms, 
including those like Google that offer much for free.”235 
On the other hand, there is reason to believe that technology platforms 
loosen corporate dominance over content creation, in turn allowing 
individual creation to flourish outside of both the incentives-based structures 
of copyright law and corporate architectures.  Copyright scholars writing 
twenty years ago had made this optimistic argument, predicting that new 
technologies would create more diffuse networks of creation, shifting the 
model of content production from a one-to-many model to a one-to-one 
model.236  And despite how the technological landscape has evolved since 
then—in many ways, for the worse, and in unforeseen ways—the prediction 
and theory that the networked landscape promotes myriad creativity and 
diversity of content has continued to prove true, over and over again.  The 
deep implications of this for copyright law—what it means for the studio 
system and what it means for content holders’ continued insistence that, due 
to corporations’ risk-taking and initial investments, it should be corporations 
that are uniquely deserving of copyright’s benefits237—are profound and 
meaningful independent of other socioeconomic and political critiques of the 
networked landscape. 
Consider a recent example.  In 2019, an artist by the name of Lil Nas X 
wrote a track under two minutes long titled “Old Town Road.”  The song, 
which defies genre categorization but which can perhaps best be described 
as country-rap, had been quietly removed from the Billboard country charts 
because it did not fit Billboard’s (that old gatekeeper of the traditional music 
industry) definition of country music.238  But in the twenty-first century 
world of streaming, industry support—in the form of advertising, or 
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Changed Its Mind, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 26, 2019, 9:24 AM), https://www.rollingstone.com/ 
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concerted “pushes” to amplify a song—hardly mattered.  The song was a 
viral sensation on the streaming platform TikTok, a neo-YouTube where 
users can post short video clips set to music.  The song relied on the hashtag 
(that generator of virality) #yeehaw, which in turn launched thousands of 
user-generated videos incorporating the song, ultimately resulting in tens of 
millions of plays on TikTok, propelling the song to a record-breaking 
nineteen weeks atop the Billboard charts.239  As industry magazine Rolling 
Stone puts it: 
That scene would be unimaginable 20 years ago, when radio and labels 
worked together to make hits.  Since artists needed those institutions to 
become popular, it was easy to dictate certain paths to success—a country 
hit came from a country label and earned support from country radio.  But 
now the music industry often scrambles to sign and endorse tracks like “Old 
Town Road,” which have already erupted online.  Hits are not initially 
dependent on industry support, which means that for a brief, giddy moment, 
some songs exist entirely outside of traditional commercial 
categorization.240 
A loose coalition of internet users, not the industry machine, had propelled 
the song to success.  Notably, Lil Nas X did not receive a record deal until 
after his hit went viral.  Undoubtedly, in an age before TikTok, it may well 
be that industry executives would not have taken a chance on a young 
country-rap musician.  Indeed, the very genre itself defies convention. 
The story of Lil Nas X, and so many others who have come before and 
will undoubtedly come after him, leads to one of the most important points 
about what new technologies have done, and continue to do, for content:  by 
substituting the judgment of the audience for the judgment of a professional 
gatekeeper, new technologies challenge one of the very core assumptions 
underlying copyright law.  Artists who first strike it big on TikTok, 
Bandcamp, YouTube, SoundCloud, and other types of new technology 
platforms challenge—if not render completely obsolete—the very basic 
bargain and premise underlying copyright law in critical ways.  For one, these 
artists often do not expect to be rewarded for their creations at all.241  
Consider another case:  in this example, the most popular artist of the new 
decade, Billie Eilish.242  Eilish had uploaded a song that she recorded in her 
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bedroom, “Ocean Eyes,” to the popular music-sharing, one-to-one (as I use 
the term here, meaning an endless amount of content for an endless array of 
tastes) platform SoundCloud.243  But she had only ever “intended for one 
person to listen to it:  her dance teacher.  When she woke up the next day, the 
song had gone viral.”244  There was no calculated quid-pro-quo under the 
traditional copyright reasoning:  I expend effort and time to create content 
because I expect that the content will sell and I will, in turn, reap the 
rewards.245  Eilish was simply just a teen, who, like so many teens, and like 
Lil Nas X, was just messing around. 
And, just like Lil Nas X, it was only after Eilish’s song became an internet 
sensation that the major label record deal followed.  Yet, large corporate 
copyright holders justify the need for extended copyright protection by 
pointing to both the high costs of “R&D”—in this case, scouting out new 
artists and taking risks on unproven talent—and promotion after those new 
artists are signed.246  In an age in which success comes first and the record 
deal comes later, however, this justification is upended.247  Labels can sign 
sure bets, thus eviscerating the “risky investments” rationale; further, 
because the acts they sign are already well known with established fanbases, 
the marketing and promotion justification for labels is also significantly 
diminished.248  In that sense, the content industry is looking less like other 
industries, such as venture capital or whaling, in which high returns are 
justified because no one would take on such risks without the promise of 
great rewards.249  By lowering both the costs of production, so that more and 
more amateurs are creating viral hits, and the costs of distribution and 
advertising, so that gatekeepers become less and less relevant, new 
technologies, such as streaming, challenge the core assumptions underlying 
why we need copyright law.250 
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First, if we are heading toward a future where the biggest platforms 
(Netflix, Amazon, Facebook), armed with artificial intelligence and 
algorithms, can innovate around the problem of high third-party content costs 
by creating their own content (Netflix Originals, Amazon Originals, 
Facebook Watch), then we do not need copyright law to grant these entities 
an even bigger reward in the form of a monopoly over that content.  In 
adjusting the rules of copyright in laws like the DSM, the prevailing narrative 
has been one of “giv[ing] publishers and authors the means to negotiate better 
with digital platforms.”251  Yet, this sympathetic public narrative focused on 
remunerating individual authors and small publishers misses the big point:  
today’s digital platform behemoths will be tomorrow’s publishers and 
authors.  In adjusting the rules to redistribute wealth today, we are only 
setting the stage for wealthier technology platforms tomorrow. 
Second, copyright has long been justified by appealing to incentives—in 
the form of a monopoly over subsequent copies so the copyright owner can 
recoup those first copy costs.252  But if we are to heed seriously concerns by 
the content industry that their copyrighted content is increasingly being used 
as a means to an end, as a way to lure users into their broader ecosystem—
Amazon uses Amazon Originals content to lure consumers onto the broader 
Amazon platform, so they can sell more Prime subscriptions and in turn sell 
more products; Apple uses Apple Music to sell more iPhones253—then our 
new content creators (Apple, Amazon, Netflix) will not need the “carrots” 
(incentives) of copyright law to create content at all.  These technology firms 
will create the content anyway because their business models are not reliant 
on copyright’s system of rewards; the rewards come, rather, in the form of 
more sales of iPhones or greater sales on Amazon’s consumer goods 
platform.254  And in fact, if antitrust scholars are right, if some whittling away 
of tech wealth is needed,255 copyright law can help—only by doing away 
with copyright monopolies for our new tech content creators. 
Third, not only will the new content creators not need copyright’s 
incentives system, our new content creators will also not need the sticks:  the 
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ability to assert infringement to control unauthorized distribution.  Because 
these creators are also the distributors, they can directly control how the 
content is viewed, copied, and distributed.  Gone are the days of the 
middleman—Disney relying on movie theaters to distribute its content.  The 
distributor-creator is best situated to ensure that unauthorized copying by 
third parties does not occur, through the implementation of rigorous access 
controls and digital rights management tools. 
If we are in fact heading toward a future where traditional copyright law 
will matter less and less and other forms of governance—private ordering, 
normative values, and technological controls—will take precedence, we must 
also consider whether this evidences the insufficiency of traditional 
copyright law and calls for a vastly new regulatory regime governing 
creativity altogether.  A world comprised mostly of private ordering is one 
potentially fraught with peril, as it lies largely obscured behind the opaque 
decision-making of powerful entities.  Thinking “beyond copyright,” then, 
ultimately means two dueling conceptions:  one of the inadequacies of 
current laws and one militating for its continued relevance through rebirth. 
Despite the dubious lineage of the term “value gap,” the phrase has 
persisted precisely because it raises serious questions about power—who has 
it, how it can be wielded, and the deep inequalities created by the success of 
companies like Google, Facebook, and Amazon.  By concluding that 
copyright law—a law premised in according broad, property-like, monopoly 
rights over a work—will only result in greater, not less, inequality in the long 
run, this Article does not mean to suggest that law itself is not up to the task. 
One answer might simply be to look to other areas of the law to solve the 
problems that laws like the DSM attempt to address.  For example, the EU 
already has an article in the Treaty of Rome prohibiting abuse of dominant 
position, that is, prohibiting anticompetitive conduct by dominant entities 
that cause harm to third parties that are economically dependent upon 
them.256  The United States can look to this language in reshaping its own 
antitrust laws if it determines that, for example, newspapers are dependent 
on Google for the transmission of their stories and are suffering economic 
harm as a direct result of a platform’s refusing to take out licenses.  The 
doctrine of dominant position, by its very nature, targets specific entities and 
specific fact patterns—not all online platforms and general notions of 
“bigness.” 
Likewise, rather than reshaping the doctrine of fair use—to emphasize 
factors such as commerciality (Big Tech’s excess profits) or lost licensing 
revenue (if anyone can take out a license, Big Tech can)—in a way that would 
adversely affect all users of copyrighted works, courts can instead create 
better solutions tailored to individual technology companies, in the form of 
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supervising fair and equitable class action settlements, perhaps reached in 
conjunction with legislative reform.257  On the other hand, fair use decisions, 
even if the defendant beneficiary in that particular decision happens to be, 
say, Google, have enormous trickle-down effects that could benefit 
individual artists and individual creators in vastly different creative 
contexts.258 
CONCLUSION 
Almost two decades ago, Professor James Boyle referred to various 
developments in copyright laws—the lengthening of copyright’s terms, the 
use of digital rights management tools—as a “second enclosure movement,” 
an enclosure of the “intangible commons of the mind.”259  Yet, our new era’s 
techno-pessimism, if left unchecked as it bleeds into our copyright laws, has 
perfectly coincided with yet another enclosure movement, driven by the 
neoclassicist belief that greater internalization by corporate entities who can 
best maximize profits is the most efficient means of rights allocation.260  And 
that third enclosure movement will come if we do not recognize that the path 
we are on now—gutting safe harbor protection, removing fair and reasonable 
licensing rates, whether done in the name of redistributive justice, retribution, 
or punishment for the technology companies that have been labelled the new 
“robber barons”261 of our digital age—leads inexorably to less cultural 
production and less availability of content and greater entrenchment of power 
in the same corporate conglomerates that have controlled the dissemination 
and access to copyrighted goods since the beginning of time. 
The strength of the safe harbor laws, on the other hand, was to loosen the 
grip of the old gatekeepers and create more diffuse networks of creation.262  
And, as Professor Jack Balkin had argued back when the internet was a purer 
version of its current self, this form of cultural participation is democratic—
not in the second order, not as somehow subordinate to or “less than” political 
speech or exercising the right to vote, but constitutes the very core of a fully 
participatory democracy because creating and recreating culture gets at the 
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very root of who we are, by defining what it means to be human, as an 
expression of our truest selves.263 
Of course, as with all things, the true nature of what the internet has 
evolved to become is much more complicated.  Copyright law, in its current 
form, is unequipped to grapple with the immense challenges that the new 
platform dominance has wrought.  Amidst all this, we would do well to 
remember, as technology reporter Rachel Botsman writes, that the “new 
digital world” is still “a work in progress . . . .  Perhaps the present danger is 
that in our rush to condemn the corruption of digital technologies, we will 
unfairly condemn the technologies themselves.”264  And perhaps, in this rush, 
we will mistakenly drive cultural production back into the dark ages, back 
into the cave, unwittingly sending power back to the consolidated few, back 
to ever-looping Top 40s, back to films populated by nice attractive white 
folks, back to a world ruled over by Disney, Universal, Sony, Warner—
because in this rush to condemn the internet, we have forgotten that, in the 
storybook of creativity and copyright, the narrative is altogether very, very 
different. 
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